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Dang, Thanh Phong 
From Dependence to Global Integration for Development 
A Case Study of Vietnam – From 1975 to Present 





This study examines the process of Vietnam’s global integration for development in order 
to conclude that Vietnam has been able to achieve economic development and human 
development by joining regional and global institutions and working closely with 
multilateral international development agencies.  
With proper literature reviews of economic theories and empirical studies, this study 
determines that Vietnam was able to graduate from dependence on the former Soviet 
Union and achieved economic development and human development. 
This study determines that Vietnam has become one of the best-performing developing 
economies in the world. The Vietnamese people’s standard of living has improved 
significantly. The World Bank estimates that within 10 years, from 1993 to 2004, 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction, Objectives, and Methodology 
1.1. Introduction 
Today, the global integration of Vietnam has been considered a succes story, 
particularly with its characteristics of a communist country. The process of global 
integration is seen from the country’s significant improvements to engage the world by 
graduating from the status of dependence on the former Union of Socialist Soviet 
Republics (U.S.S.R), shifting its ideological directions, and by making very crucial steps 
into regional and global organizations. The time frame to illustrate the process of 
Vietnam’s global integration is set from the country’s reunification from the Vietnam 
War in April 1975 to present. Officially, the reunification of the country was set in 
October 1976. After this, the Vietnamese leadership expected to develop Vietnam into 
prosperity by adapting a socialism-based economy. However, it failed to achieve both 
economic development as well as human development in the evidences of internal and 
external factors.  
Internally, the export turnover from 1976 to 1985 compensated for only a third of 
the import turnover and gross foreign trade turnover was very low, averaging only US$ 
1.7 billion per year. The quality of life was poor and getting worse. Daily necessities such 
as food, consumer goods, transport, and health and education facilities were seriously 
deficient. Meanwhile, rampant inflation reduced the value of salaries nd real incomes. 
Overspending of the state budget increased sharply and went from 25 percent to 45 
percent of revenues in the years after reunification1. Particularly, the Communist Party of 
                                                
1 Bui Tat Thang, After the War: 25 Years of Economic Development in Vietnam, , available from 
http://www.nira.or.jp/past//publ/review/2000spring/06thang.pdf , p. 22.  
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Vietnam, as soon as it established its nation-wide control, was very much eager to 
collectivize the capitalist South as part of the whole strategy for transition to socialism. 
However, collectives were doing badly. The attempt to extend them to the rural South 
was resisted so violently that it had to be called off. The truth was, the people were 
exhausted. Most families on both sides, North and South, had lost their loved ones in the 
decades of fighting. Those individuals who survived were physically impoverished by the 
wars’ demands and psychologically drained by the relentless drives for national 
mobilization. The entire productivity was breaking down. Absolute poverty was 
widespread2.  
In addition, the external factors were completely unfavorable for Vietnam to have 
more export and import exchanges with countries other than the Soviet (Eastern) Bloc as 
a consequence of U.S. economic sanctions against Vietnam after the fall of the U.S.-
backed Government of South Vietnam. This had led to the country’s economic and 
diplomatic isolation from Western countries. While making every possible effort to 
recover from the protracted war with huge human and material damage, roughly 2 million 
people from the Vietnam side and 50,000 (fifty thousand)  U.S. soldiers and US$ 3.25 
billion, Vietnam was faced with tough challenges for development since the national re-
unification.  As a result, Vietnam remained economically backward and diplomatically. In 
the midst of the “East Asian Miracle,” a combination of Western sanctions and economic 
mismanagement led per capita national income to fall by over 7 pecent between 1978 and 
1980
 
and to grow only slowly thereafter. Near total isolation from the West
 
imposed major 
                                                




obstacles to direct investment and market access that enabled other Southeast Asian countries 
like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand to achieve rapid export-led growth.  Also, the military 
intervention of Kampuchea (Cambodia) not only precipitated Western disengagement, but 
also triggered an escalation in tensions with China, which supported the ousted regime of Pol 
Pot3. China’s response to the Vietnamese military intervention was to step up military 
operations along Vietnam’s northern border.
 
Military pressure from the north forced Hanoi to 
rely more heavily on the Soviet Union, which provided Hanoi with economic assistance on 
the order of $3 billion a year and facilitated a trading relationship with other communist 
countries in the Eastern Bloc. But Soviet financial assistance and a paltry trade with other 
communist states could not rectify the fundamental weaknesses in Vietnam’s economy. Parts 
of the country endured severe food shortages, and imported Soviet capital failed to establish a 
productive industrial base to support the economy.
 
As Moscow’s own economic troubles 
mounted in the 1980s, support from the Soviet Union began to dry up4.  
Under these internal and external circumstances, Vietnam decided to make radical 
reforms, a part of which was to join the world for economic development and human 
development. The stages of Vietnam’s development path include the following: (1) the 
status of dependence on U.S.S.R in military, economy, diplomacy, and education; (2) the 
transition in foreign policy for outside engagement; (3) the settlement of Vietnam’s 
military intervention of Kampuchea and the normalization of relations with People’s 
                                                
3 Saloth Sar or Minh Hai, (May 19, 1928 – April 15, 1998), widely known as Pol Pot, was the leader of the 
Cambodian communist movement known as the Khmer Rouge and was Prime Minister of Democratic 
Kampuchea from 1976–1979. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pol_pot 
 
4 Oliver Babson, Diplomacy of Isolation: United States Unilateral Sanctions Policy and Vietnam 1975 – 
1995, available from http://wws.princeton.edu/research/cases/sanctions.pdf, p.6 
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Republic of China as well as the normalization of relations with the United States of 
America; and (4) the Vietnamese process of integrating into regional and global 
organizations for economic development, i.e. trade liberalization and foreign direct 
investment, and for human development, i.e. poverty reduction, education development, 
and health development as identified and targeted within the framework of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) introduced by the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration of September 2002.  
1.2. Objectives  
- To analyze how Vietnam, a communist country, has been able to achieve economic 
development and human development; and 
- To use Vietnam as a case study of development success emerging from dependence. 
1.3. Methodology and Literature Reviews 
The methodology used to prepare this thesis consisted of the four elements: (1) collection 
of secondary data, tables, figures, and indicators from documents published by World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations Development Programme, and other 
sources of references for economic development and human development; (2) description 
of the developments of policies applied by Vietnam from different periods of time; (3) 
presentation of some challenges faced by Vietnam during the current and future process 
of global integration; and (4) conclusions and recommendations. Literatur  reviews, 
theories of economic development and human development, will be applied along the 




Chapter 2 - The Dependent Period from 1975 to 1986 (Dependence on U.S.S.R) 
Soviet-Vietnamese ties were indeed closer than they had ever b en at the time of 
the communist victory in Indochina in April 1975. Soviet assistance had been 
instrumental in enabling Hanoi (North Vietnam) to complete its victory in the south of 
Vietnam after the 1973 Paris Peace Accords5 with the United States. Moreover, 
Vietnam’s traditional distrust of China increased as the rapprochement between China 
and the United States evolved. Hanoi’s border disputes with both the People’s Republic 
of China and Cambodia and its conflict with the former over the Paracel6 nd Spartly7 
island groups in the South China Sea alienated Hanoi further from China. Vietnam had 
essentially nowhere to turn but to the Soviet for military aid (China’s was halted with the 
end of the war) and economic assistance, and as a way out of its diplomatic isolation8. 
In theory, there are different mechanisms of dependence. Most theoris  w uld 
agree that  a less developed country (LDC) can be considered externally dependent to the 
extent that some or all of these are true: (1 )it is host to foreign direct investment; (2) its 
economy is strongly oriented to external trade; (3) it receiv s a large amount of foreign 
economic assistance; (4) it devotes considerable resources to the servicing of foreign 
                                                
5 The Paris Peace Accords of 1973, intended to establish peace in Vietnam and an end to the Vietnam 
Conflict, ended direct U.S. military involvement and temporarily stopped the fighting between north and
south. The governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the Republic of Vietnam 
(South Vietnam), and the United States, as well as the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) that 
represented indigenous South Vietnamese revolutionaries signed the Agreement on Ending the War and 
Restoring Peace in Vietnam on January 27, 1973. Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Peace_Accords. 
6 The Paracel Islands consist of over 30 islets, sandb ks or reefs, occupy about 15,000 km2 of the ocean 
surface, and located in the South China Sea, also known as East Vietnam Sea or East Sea, available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paracel_Islands.  
7 The Spratly Islands are a group of more than 650 reefs,  islets, atolls, cays and islands in the South China 
Sea between the Philippines and Vietnam, available t http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spratly_Islands. 
8 Robert C. Horn, Alliance Politics Between Comrades: The Dynamics of Soviet – Vietnamese Relations, 
RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, 1987, p.8 
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debts; (5) it trains a large proportion of its university students i  a relatively few 
advanced countries; and (6) it maintains close military ties with more advanced nations 
and devotes considerable resources to the purchase of arms abroad9. In practice, some of 
the features were particularly true for the case of Vietnam’s dependence on the former 
U.S.S.R.   
2.1 Military Dependence 
The U.S.S.R. had a very important role to play in providing military assistance for 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam in short, to win the Vietnam War. 
By estimation, the U.S.S.R supplied about 75% of North Vietnam’s military h rdware 
compared to 15% from China (mainland) and East Europe about 10%. After the war, 
Vietnam remained dependent on military assistance from the U.S.S.R as viewed by the 
Vietnamese to defend the country from potential threats with the Kampuchea War (1977 
– 1978) and the Sino-Vietnam War (1979) and to preserve the revolutionary 
achievements from the Vietnam War. This was also viewed by the U.S.S.R. to use the 
Vietnamese territory for Soviet forward-deployment air and naval bases from 
Vladivostok (2,220 miles or 10 days by steamer – from Cam Ranh Base in th middle 
part of Vietnam) to the Indian Ocean. Though the Soviet military assistance to Vietnam 
was not increasing so much between 1976 and 1977, it began to soar thereafter, 
especially at a time when Vietnam was fighting with Kampuchea and China for border 
conflicts,  as illustrated in the following table: 
 
                                                
9 Vincent A. Mahler,  “Dependency Approaches to International Political Economy – A Cross-National 




Table 1 Military Aid from the U.S.S.R to Vietnam 
Year Amount  Year Amount 
1976 $44.7 million 1977 $80 million 
1978 $700 million 1979 $890 million 
1980 $790 million 1981 $450 million 
1982 $900 million  1983 $1.2 billion 
1984 $1.3 billion  1985 $1.7 billion 
Source: Vietnam and The Soviet Union – Anatomy of an Alliance by Douglas Pike – 
Westview Press, Boulder and London 1987  
 
 As part of the articles of the U.S.S.R – Vietnam Friendship and Cooperation 
Treaty signed in 1978 by Hanoi top official delegation led by Le Duan10, then Party Chief 
of Vietnam during their visit to Moscow, for example, 20 MIG-24 swept-wing fighter 
planes made their ways to Hanoi. Later this year, a Soviet mili ary mission was 
established, and Soviet military advisers and military assistance started to be present in 
quantity in Vietnam. The tonnage of delivered military aid doubled each year from 1977 
through 1980 and then leveled off  in reflection of Vietnam’s fight against the Pol Pot 
regime in Kampuchea (December 1978) and with China in the border conflict (February 
1979). Undoubtedly, Vietnam was heavily dependent on the U.S.S.R military assistance 
in all branches with priority given to air defenses, including the stationing of MIG-23 
swing-wing interceptors and augmentation of the missile defenses i  major cities such as 
Hai Phong, Huong Khe, Vinh, Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Bien Hoa. The U.S.S.R military 
aid to Vietnam was also  in quality. The People’s Army of Vietnam, PAVN, received the 
                                                
10 Lê Duẩn (b. April 7, 1907 - d. July 10, 1986) was a Vietnamese communist leader. He became North 
Vietnam's acting party chief in late 1956. By 1958, he was the country's top policy maker, although 
nominally number two behind figurehead Hồ Chí Minh. He officially became the top leader when Hồ died 
in 1969. After that, Duẩn assumed formal leadership of North Vietnam's governm nt. After the communist 
takeover of South Vietnam in 1975, Duẩn became leader of a unified Vietnamese state. He approved a 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia late in 1978 to overthrow the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge government 
of that country. Source:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Le_Duan.  
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most advanced type of missile attack patrol boats from the Soviet Navy, namely the OSA 
Class II (240 tons, 40 meters in length, carrying four SSN-2 STYX surface-to-surface 
missiles). The military condition of Vietnam’s dependence on the U.S.S.R could be 
assessed by the Soviet Embassy Air-Naval Attache Colonel Davydov that “the Soviet 
Union and its armed forces have provided and will provide SRV (Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam) with all the necessary assistance for consolidating the SRV’s defense 
capability”. In addition to military aid, Vietnam was also heavily dependent on the 
U.S.S.R economically.  
2.2. Economic Dependence 
From September to December 1975, then Party Chief Le Duan headed a team of 
foreign aid experts on a trip to the U.S.S.R and seven other communist countries. In 
Moscow, he signed two agreements. The one signed on October 30, 1975 was forlong-
term loans with credit under highly favorable term (10 years). This agreement aimed at 
rationalizing and modernizing the agricultural sector, developing key industrial sectors 
such as primarily electric power, mining, chemistry and tool manufacture, and supplying 
oil, grain, raw cotton and other commodities. The other signed on Decemb r 18, 1975 
was for economic aid and technical assistance. It covered some forty major projects in 
electric power, food industry, production of building materials and geological surveys. 
Both of the two agreements were in support of the second Five-Year Plan (1976 – 1980) 
of Vietnam. The estimated cost was $ 3-4 billion to which the U.S.S.R agreed to fund 
60%, roughly at $1.2 billion in addition to $700 million in commodity aid avail ble 
during the same period. The year 1978 witnessed the beginning of the changed 
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relationship between Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. Vietnam signed more than a dozen 
economic aid and other agreements with the U.S.S.R. On June 29, 1978, Vietnam was 
admitted as the tenth member of the Communist Common Market System at the Prime 
Minister’s Meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)11 in 
Bucharest. Later this year in November, Le Duan and a large delegation of top Hanoi 
officials visited Moscow to sign a series of agreements related to security, economic and 
military aid, trade, and science and technology. However, the continuing inability of the 
Hanoi’s leadership to solve the country’s basic economic problems and its two wars as 
indicated above did deepen the Vietnamese economic dependence on the U.S.S.R. nder 
the mechanism of CMEA, the U.S.S.R provided Vietnam with 70% of all its imports in a 
total of $12 billion worth in 1979, accounting for 94% of its raw cotton, 90% of its oil, 
steel, and fertilizer, and 70% of its imported grain (3 million tons). The Vietnamese 
economic dependence on the U.S.S.R was also seen from the U.S.S.R project aid. From 
1975 to January 1985, the majority of about 950 projects - electric power, mining, oil and 
gas, manufacturing and industrial areas, transportation and communication, nd 
agriculture – had been launched. Among them were 200 major projects which had been 
put into operation with financial and technical assistance from the U.S.S.R. The table 
below indicates how deep the Vietnamese economic dependence was on the U.S.S.R. 
 
                                                
11 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Russian: Совет экономической взаимопомощи, Sovet 
ekonomicheskoy vsaymopomoshchi, СЭВ, SEV, English abbreviation COMECON, CMEA, or CAME), 
1949–1991, was an economic organization of communist states and a kind of Eastern Bloc equivalent to—
but more geographically inclusive than—the European Economic Community. The military equivalent to 
the Comecon was the Warsaw Pact, though Comecon's membership was significantly wider. The Comecon 
was the Eastern Bloc's reply to the formation of the OEEC (Organization of European Economic Co-
operation). Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COMECON 
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Table 2 Economic Aid from the U.S.S.R. to Vietnam 
Year Amount  Year Amount 
1976 $ 560 -750 million 1977 $570 million – $1 
billion 
1978 $700 million - $1 billion 1979 $800 million - $1.1 
billion 
1980 $2.9 – 3.2 billion 1981 $0.9 billion  
1982 $1.18 billion  1983 $1.3 billion 
1984 $1.4 billion  1985 $1.6 billion 
Source : Vietnam and The Soviet Union – Anatomy of an Alliance by Douglas Pike – 
Westview Press, Boulder and London 1987  
 
2.3. Diplomatic Dependence 
The Soviet diplomats supported and defended Vietnam’s military intervetion in  
Kampuchea at the United Nations and other international gatherings. The U.S.S.R vetoed 
a UN Security Council resolution, sponsored by the members of the Association of South 
East Nations (ASEAN), requesting withdrawal of foreign troops from Indochinese 
countries. In addition, Moscow supported Ha Noi for the issue of refugees (boat people), 
which emerged after the Vietnam War. The Indochinese exodus was one of the great 
migrations in modern history involving more than 1 million people. However, Moscow 
treated it as a non-problem as illustrated by the Soviet attitude towards an incident with 
fleeing refugees and a Norwegian aid project in 1980. The incident had i that Norway 
donated a sophisticated fishing trawler to Vietnam and sent along a Norwegian crew to 
demonstrate its use. At sea, the trawler encountered some refugees in a small open boat. 
A Vietnamese security squad aboard the trawler opened fire with mac ine guns, killing 
all the refugees. Horrified by this scene, the Norwegian fishermen immediately returned 
the trawler to port and embarked on the first available plane for Oslo, refusing official 
gifts offered to them at Hanoi airport. The Norwegian government backed their action by 
11 
 
rejecting a “complaint” from Hanoi, whereupon the U.S.S.R volunteered to send a crew 
to replace the Norwegian. The Vietnamese military intervention in Kampuchea, although 
considered as legitimate in view of national defense, and  the issu of boat people put the 
country into a political isolation that inevitably deepened its diplomatic (or political) 
dependence on the U.S.S.R. The Vietnamese also received a significant support of 
education from the U.S.S.R. 
2.4. Education Dependence 
The U.S.S.R undertook the training of 2,000 technicians and 400 vocational 
education teachers per year in support of the Vietnam’s 1976 – 1980 Five – Year Plan. 
There had been an intensive effort by Moscow to insinuate itselfnto the Vietnamese 
educational system. Accordingly, educational institutions in Vietnam relied increasingly 
on Soviet sources for everything from textbooks to school buildings since 1978. By 1985, 
more than one hundred Vietnamese educational institutions and state research institutes 
were involved in systematic educational programs with the U.S.S.R. Particularly, during  
the 1980 – 1985 Five-Year Plan, the number of Vietnamese full-time students in the 
U.S.S.R at any one time was about 30,000. Apart from the number of Vietnamese 
students attending educational institutions in the U.S.S.R, Vietnam also hosted  Soviet 
educators and educational advisers. As estimated, there were about 2,000 Soviet 
educators and educational advisers working in the country in 1982. Additionally, 
Vietnamese educational dependence on the U.S.S.R included school constructi. From 
the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 to 1985, Soviet constructed eight vocational training 
schools and three industrial teachers colleges, and equipped three more.  
12 
 
Chapter 3 - The Transitional Period from 1986 to 1995 
As seen from the political, security, and economic points of view, the deep 
dependence on the U.S.S.R was crucial to Vietnam during its process f immersing the 
two economies of the North and the South and the wars fought with Kampuchea and 
China. Yet, the dependence cost Vietnam dearly in economic backwardness that put the 
country into hunger and poverty in addition to international isolation.  
3.1 Economic development and human development under dependence on U.S.S.R 
Under the full dependence on the U.S.S.R, Vietnam remained an impoverished 
country, barely able to feed its increasing population, with little heavy and only limited 
light industry to produce trade goods. With the dependent elements as presented above, 
the centrally planned Vietnamese economy was quite similar to the Soviet Bloc’s model 
on the grounds of internal mechanism and poor levels of development. While it was not a 
total closed economy, Vietnam gained a little economic development particularly when 
the Vietnam War came to an end in 1975. Instead of concentrating on rec ve ing 
economy, improving labor skills, and producing more agricultural products and consumer 
goods as results of heavy damage from the war, Vietnam adopted an conomic policy by 
prioritizing heavy industry and “revolution of the relations of production” with the 
extension of the centrally-planned mechanism in the North to the South where it used to 
drive its economic development in the capitalism model. Though some industral projects 
were built, such as electricity power, cement production, and other sector  supported by 
13 
 
the U.S.S.R, the economy remained stagnant12. The principal causes13 for the failure of 
economic development could be summarized as follows: 
- The enforcement of the socialist reform of the economy in the South by 
collectivization of agricultural farms and nationalism of trade and industry completely 
damaged the people’s incentives for production in the South. 
- Excessive bureaucracy, distorted prices, and the incentive system, and the wrong 
industrialization strategy – all the products of a central command economy – greatly 
hindered its economic efficiency. 
- Vietnamese military intervention in Kampuchea since the end of 1978 had not 
only caused the China-Vietnam War, but also resulted in a diplomatic isolation of the 
country, which further strained its resources.  
Under these circumstances, the Vietnam leaders thought of how to move away 
from outward dependence on the U.S.S.R to engagement in the world. The year 1986, 
unlike 1978 that marked the deeper dependence, was a significant time for Vi tnam to 
start the process of engagement by ideological modification, institutional and structural 
reforms.   
Ideologically, as indicated by Vo Van Kiet14, then Chairman of the Vietnamese 
State Planning Commission and a key economic reformer, the economic gals had not 
been met mainly because too much money had been spent on large-scale industrial 
                                                
12 Bui Tat Thang, After the War: 25 Years of Economic Development in Vietnam, , available from 
http://www.nira.or.jp/past//publ/review/2000spring/06thang.pdf 
13 James W.Morley and Masashi Nishihara, Editors, Vietnam Joins the World, An East Gate Book, 
Copyright @1997 by M.E. Sharpe, Inc., p.38.  
14 Võ Văn Kiệt (23 November 1922 - 11 June 2008[1]) was a Vietnamese politician and statesman. He was 
Prime Minister of Vietnam from 8 August 1991 to 25 September 1997. He was one of the Vietnamese 




projects also left unfinished. He also said that China was making tremendous efforts in its 
economic recovery by adopting some capitalist measures, and urged Vietnam to consider. 
As communist country, however, Vietnam had to rely on the ideology of Marxism-
Leninism as an economically and politically driving force. Against this ideological 
background, then General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh15, a reform-minded leader, stated 
that  
Bold use must be made of the potential of all economic structures in the country, 
including private and individual structures. But this does not mean that elements 
of capitalist exploitation will be restored. The leading role will always belong to 
the socialist sector.  
 
This was backed up by the Party’s media organ, Nhan Dan Daily News, that we 
are using capitalists to improve our economy. Marxism is against exploitation – not 
against being rich. Sometimes we misunderstand Marxism… that there will be no rich 
people and everyone will be equal can only happen in the advanced phase of c pitalism. 
In the meantime, we have to put up with people being rich because they are talented and 
have a good mind.  
3.2. The Communist Party’s Sixth Congress in December 1986 
With the above ideology in mind, the Sixth Congress of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party (December 1986) marked a turning point of great significance to 
transform the Vietnamese economy to an open, market-oriented, and globally integrated 
model. This model was to (1) enact policies for the integration of Vietnam into the world 
                                                
15 Nguyễn Văn Linh (July 1, 1915–April 27, 1998) was a political leader of the Vietcong during the 
Vietnam War. He was the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam from 1986 to 1991. During 
his time in office, Linh was a strong advocate of "doi moi" (renovation), an economic plan whose aim is to 
turn Vietnam economy to a market economy. As such, Linh was often touted the Vietnamese Gorbachev 




and regional economies; (2) speed up foreign trade activities, encouraging foreign direct 
investments; and (3) stimulate the development of private organizations, individuals, and 
economic sectors. This model,  known worldwide as “Doi Moi” in Vietnamese and 
“Renovation” or “Open-door Policy” in English, was made under the influe ce of the 
twenty-seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 
February 1986 with the slogans of “glasnost”  and “perestroika” by then Soviet Party 
Leader Gorbachev. Frustrated with the Vietnamese lack of reform and m nagement, he 
should be pleased with the degree to which his influence has been felt i  the realm of 
“glasnost” or “open door”. Based on this model, Vietnam has been adopting the measures 
that are closely related to the Neoclassical Model of Economic Development proposed by 
Robert Solow that “Economic growth can be exogenous. It depends upon freer 
international trade, reduction in administration, more open markets, privatization, and 
reduction in government interference”. In carrying out this model, Vietnam did make a 
crucial move in modifying the Marxism – Leninism ideology with certain elements of 
capitalism for development and engagement in the world from being depen nt on the 
U.S.S.R. To prepare for this process, Vietnam made major changes in in titutions and 
economic structure.  
Institutionally, in order to put this ideology as shown in the above policy making 
into practice, Vietnam implemented some key institutional readjustments as demanded by 
the open-door policy. To this end, Vietnam enhanced the functions performed by the 
relevant governmental agencies, especially the establishment of Ministry of Planning and 
Investment (MPI)  from the State Planning Commission and the State Committee for 
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Cooperation and Investment. The MPI proposed strategies for domestic economi  
development and foreign direct investment incentives to the government. Ministry of 
Trade and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were also given more functio s to perform in more 
foreign trade relations and diplomatic relations with countries all over the world. Back to 
the period of Vietnamese dependence on the U.S.S.R., the Ministry of Trade used to 
handle imports and exports mainly with the Soviet under the framework of Commodity 
Exchange and Payment Agreement (1981 – 1985). The role played by Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was also meaningful during the process of Vietnam’s engagement in the 
world. What Vietnam has achieved as of today largely depends on the smooth 
coordination of the three indicated ministries, especially the efforts made by the Ministry 
of Trade and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the process of joining re ional and global 
organizations for economic development and human development.  
Structurally, Vietnam has been making structural adjustments in privately owned 
and state-owned as well as agriculture sectors. In realization of the importance on 
privatization attached to economic development, Vietnam had shown its positive manner 
in the process of facilitating the development of privately owned enterprises (POE) and 
reforming state-owned enterprises (SOE).  In his opening remarks to the National 
Assembly in November 1999, then Prime Minister stressed the importance of creating a 
favorable climate for private sector development, and in the same year, the Enterprise 
Law was enacted to provide a strong basis for private sector development. Also, 
privatization is defined economically as a method of reallocating assets and resources 
from the public sector to the private sector. In Vietnam, it is the process of reducing 
17 
 
importance of stated-owned enterprises as shown decline hereunder in th  major shares in 
manufacturing, bank credit, and non-oil exports.   






- SOE share in manufacturing was down to roughly 43% from 48%; SOE share in bank 
credit from 53% to 38%; and SOE share in non-oil exports from 63% to 33% for the 
1998 – 2004 period. The process of privatization will be illustrated in moredetails in the 
part of Achievements in economic development.  
According to the economist W. Arthur Lewis,   Structural Transformation is the 
general theory of the development process in surplus-labor the Third Wo ld nations 
during most of the 1960s and early 1970s. It still has many adherents today. In the Lewis 
model, the underdeveloped economy consists of two sectors: a traditional, overpopulated 
rural subsistence sector characterized by zero marginal labor productivity classified as 
surplus labor possibly withdrawn from, and a high-productivity modern urban industrial 
sector into which labor from the subsistence sector is gradually tr nsferred. Both labor 
transfer and modern-sector employment growth are brought about by output expansion in 
that sector 16.  This model is suited to Vietnam as a primarily agricultura economy for its 
                                                
16 Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith, Economic Development – Ninth Edition, Pearson Addidon 
Wesley, 2006, p.108 
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structural reform. With the table below17 of GDP share by sectors in Vietnam  from 1990 
to 2005, agriculture’s share of total output decreased noticeably while output in the 
industrial and services sectors increased. 
Table 3 Structural Transformation in Vietnam 
SECTOR AGRICULTURE  INDUSTRY SERVICES 
% GDP  (1990) 41 23 36 
% GDP  (1994) 29 30 42 
% GDP  (1995) 27.2 Unknown 44 
% GDP  (1997) 26 31 43 
% GDP  (1999) 25.8 33.5 40.7  
% GDP (2000) 24.5 Unknown 38.8  
% GDP (2005) 20.89 41.04 38.7  
 
One of the significant domestic changes in Vietnam to be prepared for the open-
door policy is the legal framework for trade policy as illustrated in the below table: 
 Table 4 Major changes in trade policy in the first few years of Doi Moi 

















- Law on Foreign Investment — 
introduction of ‘open door’ policy 
 
- Foreign exchange control decree 
liberalises 
retention of foreign exchange, opening 
of foreign currency accounts, use of 
transfers to pay for imports and repay 
foreign loans 
- Devaluation of trade and invisible 
payments 
exchange rates 
- VI Party Congress declares beginning of 
Doi Moi 
 
- Land law established  private use of 
allocated land in agriculture 
- Creation of a central treasury to execute 
the budget 
 
- Creation of two tier banking system 
- Cooperative method of agriculture 
production 
abandoned in favor of households 
- Farming households given long term 
rights to use land for agricultural 
                                                
17  Sources: 1. Vietnam – An Asian Developing Country in Transition – Case Study  Australia – 
Government Education Resource Achievements in Social Economic Developments  2. Achievements in 
















































- Restrictions on establishment of 
foreign trading 
organisations relaxed and central 
government 
monopoly of foreign trade terminated 
- Law on Import and Export Duties 
introduces the customs tariff 
  
- Quotas removed on all but ten export 
and 14 import commodities 
(subsequently reduced to seven export 
and 12 import commodities) 
- Requirement that SOEs fulfill CMEA 
export targets before exporting to 
convertible currency area removed  
- Number of export commodities 
subject to export duties reduced from 
30 to 12 and most rates reduced 
- Producers of exportables allowed to 
sell to any appropriately licensed 
foreign trade company 
- Number of import commodities 
subject to duties reduced from 124 to 
80, range of rates expanded from 5–50 
per cent to 5–120 per cent 
- Foreign exchange rate system unified 
 
- Special sales tax introduced 
- Turnover tax and profit tax introduced 







- Foreign exchange trading floors 
opened at SBV 
- Regulation on setting up export 
processing zones (EPZs) promulgated 
- Export duty on rice reduced from 10 
per cent to 1 per cent 
- Imported inputs used to produce 
exports exempted from duty 
production 
- Encouragement of private enterprises 
becomes 
official policy 
- Land Law creates nontransferable. 
exclusive land 
use rights for agriculture 
 
 
- Nearly all forms of direct subsidisation 
of production and price control removed 
— end of ‘two price’ system 
- Domestic trading in gold legalised 
- Ordinance on Economic Contracts 
establishes rights 
for legal entities to enter into contracts 












- Law for State Bank of Vietnam and 
National Law on 
Banks, Cooperative Credit Institutions 
and Financial 
Institutions enacted, prohibiting SBV 
from commercial banking and 
empowering it as central bank 
- Law on Private Enterprises establishes 
legal basis for 
establishment of sole proprietorships 
- Law on Companies establishes legal 
basis for, limited 
liability and shareholder business entities 
 
- Agriculture Bank of Vietnam allowed to 






- Private companies allowed to directly 
engage in international trade 
 
- Harmonised system of tariff 
nomenclature 
introduction 
- Foreign investment law amended to 
reduce 
discrimination in favour of joint 
ventures against 
100 per cent foreign owned enterprises, 
and to 
introduce build operate transfer (BOT) 
concept for infrastructure projects 
- Trade agreement signed with 
European Union (EU) establishes quota 
on exports of textiles and clothing to 
EU and grants tariff preference on 











- New constitution allows individuals to 
exercise 
property rights over income producing 
assets and 
personal property 
- Pilot equitisation program for SOEs 
introduced 
 
Source: Trade, Development, and Poverty Reduction – The Case of Vietnam, available 
at: http://www.cuts-citee.org/PDF/BACKGROUNDER-Final_Vietnam.pdf  
 
In order to escape international isolation and take advantage of structural changes 
in external conditions, Hanoi launched a new diplomatic offensive consisting of four 
parts: (1) to get out of the Cambodian quagmire; (2) to improve relations with ASEAN 
countries; (3) to normalize relations with the United States; and (4) to normalize relations 
with the People’s Republic of China18. 
3.3. Detaching from Kampuchea  
In addition to the above radical reform in foreign policy, Vietnam was in need of 
settling the issue of its military intervention in Kampuchea as a pre-requisite for 
engagement as demanded by those countries and regional organizations Vietnam wished 
                                                
18 James W.Morley and Masashi Nishihara, Editors, Vietnam Joins the World, An East Gate Book, 
Copyright @1997 by M.E. Sharpe, Inc., p.141. 
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to re-establish or establish relations with, such as the United States of America, People’s 
Republic of China, and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).  
The Vietnamese military intervention in Kampuchea, begun at midnight, 
December 24, 1978, was the decisive turning point both for bilateral relations between 
Vietnam and Kampuchea and for the triangular relations among the People’s Republic of 
China, the U.S.S.R and Vietnam. A new structure of regional confrontation became 
evident. On the one hand, a dual rivalry divided Cambodia: the antagonism between 
China and the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, the “brother enemy” confrontation between 
pro-Soviet communists and pro-Chinese ones, with the Beijing-Khmer Rouge alliance 
politically backed by ASEAN as well as the Western capitals19.  
Vietnam’s policy towards the issue of military intervention in Kampuchea and the 
normalization of relations with China was made clear at the Eleventh Conference of the 
Foreign Ministers of Indochina held in Phnom Penh, the capital of Kampuchea, in August 
1985. In a Joint Statement at this Conference, Vietnam expressed a desire for 
normalization of relations with China and the intention, publicly mentioned for the first 
time, to complete the withdrawal of the Vietnamese voluntary troops fr m Kampuchea 
before 1990.  The nature of the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from 
Kampuchea was closely related to, by Vietnam’s expectation, progress on such other 
issues as the lifting of U.S. embargo against Vietnam, the start of talks on U.S. – Vietnam 
normalization of relations, as well as China – Vietnam normalization of relations. This 
was really a significant concession of Vietnam to escape from international isolation, or 
                                                
19 James W.Morley and Masashi Nishihara, Editors, Vietnam Joins the World, An East Gate Book, 




in other words, had doors opened for Vietnam to engage the world. Consequently, the 
Vietnamese troop withdrawal brought the international community closer together at the 
Paris Accord on Kampuchea. This Accord was concluded in October 1991. Accordingly,   
China declared an end to its aid to the Khmer Rouge, making it clear that China had split 
with Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge. The withdraw of the last group of 
Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea in  September 1989 constituted confirmation of the 
definite change in Vietnam’s Kampuchea policy that had evolved since 1985. It was 
Heng Samrin20 of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), who first announced in 
January 1989, on the occasion of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers’ Conference, that 
Vietnam would complete its withdrawal before September 1989 on the condition that a 
political solution would be reached in advance. However, three months later, in April, 
Hanoi announced the withdrawal within the same time limit without any condition 
attached at this time. The biggest reason behind this unconditional withdrawal was to 
prove to the international community Vietnam’s desire for peace in Kampuchea21.  
3.4. Normalizing Relations with People’s Republic of China 
 The hostility between the former “comrades” occurred in the years 1979 – 1990. 
China was outraged that Vietnam successfully expelled the China-backed Pol Pot regime 
in a very short time22, established the pro-Vietnam Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh, 
                                                
20 Heng Samrin (born 1934) is a Cambodian Communist poli ician.[1], vice chairman (1998-2006) and 
chairman of the National Assembly Cambodia since 2006. The Khmer Rouge collapsed in 1979, and Heng 
set up a new Communist government. He became chairman of the People's Revolutionary Council in 1979. 
In 1981 he became chairman of the Council of State and secretary-general of the People's Revolutionary 
Party. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heng_Samrin 
21 James W.Morley and Masashi Nishihara, Editors, Vietnam Joins the World, An East Gate Book, 
Copyright @1997 by M.E. Sharpe, Inc., p.143. 
22 Vietnam sent volunteer troops to Kampuc hea  December 24, 1978 and drove the Pol Pot out of 
Cambodia in January 1979.  
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and called for a “battle alliance” of the three Indochinese countries23, and had already 
concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Laos. China then denounced 
Vietnam as the “Cuba of the East,” charging it with carrying out proxy activities for the 
Soviet Union. China also accused Vietnam of being a “small hegemonist” with an 
ambition to form a “ Federation of Indochina” and thereby gain hegemony in South East 
Asia. The charge, of course, was denounced by Vietnam. In early 1979, Deng Xiaoping24 
visited the United States. On January 30, he revealed his plan to punish Vietnam to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to the former President Jimmy Carter and 
appeared to receive de facto approval. On February 17, Chinese forces initiated a “self-
defensive counterattack” across the Vietnam border, and after occupying Lang Son 
province on March 5, withdrew behind the border. Although the war was called 
defensive, it was clear that Chinese intentions were, first, to constrain Vietnamese action 
in Kampuchea by threatening the northern part of the country and, second, to “punish” 
Vietnam” for not only violating the international code of nonaggression, but also for 
expelling the pro-China Khmer Rouge regime from Phnom Penh. Apart from attacking 
Vietnam from the northern part of the country, China was an active player in the 
prolonged war in Kampuchea by providing most of the military assistance that kept the 
Khmer Rouge in the field and encouraged them to join the popular Prince Norodom 
                                                
23 The three Indochinese countries include: Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.  
24 Deng Xiaoping (simplified Chinese: 邓小平; traditional Chinese: 鄧小平; pinyin: Dèng Xiǎopíng; 
Wade-Giles: Teng Hsiao-p'ing; 22 August 1904 – 19 February 1997) was a prominent Chinese 
revolutionary, politician, pragmatist and reformer, as well as the late leader of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC). Deng never held office as the head of state or the head of government, but served as the de 




Sihanouk25, whom China also supported, and Son Sann26, the former premier, to form a 
united anti-Vietnam front27.  
 The situation in Kampuchea was stalemated until the late 1980’s, when the 
ravages of the war, the failures of the socialist system, and the loss of financial support 
from its Soviet and the East European allies forced Vietnam to make a fundamental 
change of direction. The war in Kampuchea was terminated, the economi  reform was 
undertaken from the Sixth National Party Congress in December 1986, and the doors 
were opened to peaceful engagement in the world community. It was in thi  context that 
the decision was taken to try to put relations with China on a new footing. For its part, 
China, suffering from the international isolation imposed after the Tiananmen Incident28 
in June 1989, also saw the desirability of détente. Unofficial contacts picked up. Cross-
border trade was resumed. In September 1990, in the context of the Kampuchea peace 
negotiations, a secret meeting between leaders of the two countries was held in Chengdu, 
China. Jiang Zemin29, Li Peng30 from China and  Nguyen Van Linh, Pham Van Dong31 
                                                
25 King Norodom Sihanouk regular script (born October 31, 1922) 
was the King of Cambodia until his abdication on October 7, 2004. He is now "King-Father (Khmer: 
Preahmâhaviraksat) of Cambodia," a position in which he retains many of his former responsibilities as 
constitutional King. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norodom_Sihanouk. 
26 Son Sann (October 5, 1911 – December 19, 2000) was a Cambodian politician and anti-communist 
resistance leader. Born in Phnom Penh, he held the office of Prime Minister in 1967-68. Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Son_Sann. 
27 James W.Morley and Masashi Nishihara, Editors, Vietnam Joins the World, An East Gate Book, 
Copyright @1997 by M.E. Sharpe, Inc., pp.120 - 121. 
 
28 The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 culminating in the Tiananmen Square Massacre (referred to in 
Chinese as the June Fourth Incident, o avoid confusion with two other Tiananmen Square protests) were a 
series of demonstrations in and near Tiananmen Square in Beijing in the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
beginning on April 14. Led mainly by students and itellectuals, the protests occurred in a year that saw the 
collapse of a number of communist governments around the world. Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989.  
29 Jiang Zemin (simplified Chinese: 江泽民; traditional Chinese: 江澤民; pinyin: Jiāng Zémín; Wade-
Giles: Chiang Tse-min; born 17 August 1926) was the "core of the third generation" of Communist Party of 
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from Vietnam attended the meeting. After the meeting, exchanges between the two 
countries became frequent.  
Finally in November 1991, two weeks after the conclusion of the Paris Accord on 
Cambodia, official relations between Vietnam and China were restored. By 
normalization, however, the Vietnamese did not mean to signal a return to the heady days 
when they saw the Chinese as comrades in a struggle of global proportions. The two 
countries are, of course, intensely interested in each other’s reform policies. As Nguyen 
Van Linh and Vo Van Kiet remarked on the occasion of Jiang Zemin’s visit in November 
1994, one of the things that drew the countries together was the similarity of their 
situations and the possibility therefore of “learning” from each other. Each was trying to 
transform a planned economy into a market economy. Each wanted to integrate into the 
world market. Each was trying to preserve its political system by a single party. Each 
shared the view that for reform and economic development, a peaceful int rnational 
environment was indispensable32.   
 The diplomatic resolutions with Cambodia and China have brought about securi y 
to Vietnam for economic development as these countries have become trading partners 
                                                                                                                                                 
China leaders, serving as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China from 1989 to 2002, as 
President of the People's Republic of China from 1993 to 2003, and as Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission from 1989 to 2004. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiang_Zemin.  
30 Li Peng (simplified Chinese: 李鹏; traditional Chinese: 李鵬; pinyin: Lǐ Péng; Wade-Giles: Li P'eng), 
(born 20 October 1928) was the Premier of China betwe n 1987 and 1998, the Chairman of the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) from 1998 to 
2003 and was second-ranking in the Communist Party of China (CPC) behind Jiang Zemin on the Politburo 
Standing Committee until 2002. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li_Peng 
31 Phạm Văn ðồng  (March 1, 1906 – April 29, 2000) was an associate of Hồ Chí Minh. He served as 
Prime Minister of North Vietnam from 1955 through 1976, and was Prime Minister of reunified Vietnam 
from 1976 until he retired in 1987. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pham_Van_Dong 
32 James W.Morley and Masashi Nishihara, Editors, Vietnam Joins the World, An East Gate Book, 




with Vietnam. This has led to increasing trading activities at the bilateral levels between 
Vietnam and Cambodia and Vietnam and China respectively within the frameworks of 
ASEAN and World Trade Organization (WTO).  Given below are the illustrating 
statistics of the Vietnamese trading and foreign direct investment activities with these two 
countries.  
In 2006 alone, exports between Cambodia and Vietnam increased up to 30%; the 
export turnover from Vietnam to Cambodia reached 780 million U.S. dollars, and that 
from Cambodia to Vietnam reached 170 million U.S. dollars. The two-way exports 
would be expected at 2 billion U.S. dollars by 2010 as replied by Ambassador of the 
Kingdom of Royal Cambodia to Vietnam to press interviews on the occasion of the 40th 
Anniversary of the Diplomatic Relationship between the two countries in the capital of 
Hanoi, Vietnam.  
According to the Ministry of Planning and Investment of Vietnam, Chinese 
investors have 437 projects worth of 1,182 billion U.S. dollars operative in Vietnam as of 
April 2007. China ranks 14/77 on the list of countries and territories with foreign direct 
investments in Vietnam.  
Therefore, the successful relationships with Cambodia and China have brought 
about not only border security but also trading prosperity to Vietnam, thus making the 
country a safe and favorable climate for foreign direct investment.  
3.5. Normalizing relations with the United States of America 
Dealing with the United States became a hard part since both sides had quite a 
number of outstanding issues, such as: a peaceful political settlemen  in Cambodia after 
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the Vietnamese troop withdrawal, the Prisoners of War (POW) and Missing in Action 
(MIA), the key issues as indicated in the so-called roadmap for a n rmalization process 
presented by the George H.W. Bush Administration in  April 1991. Earlier in the 1980’s, 
both countries showed their willingness to work with each other on a humanitarian 
operation. Late U.S. President Ronald Reagan dispatched his special envoy, late General 
John W. Vessey to Vietnam for talks with Tran Quang Co, Vice Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Vietnam about the resettlement in the U.S. for former South Vietnamese 
Government officials, military and civil, as well as those working closely with the U.S. 
government and U.S. military forces. They were released from the re-education camps. 
Regardless of how hard it is, Vietnam has been making thus far outstanding efforts in 
successfully dealing with the U.S. on two key humanitarian and economic issues.  
In respect to the POW/MIA issue, Vietnam delivered significant documents to the 
U.S. This led to the declaration by former President Bill Clinton in July 1993 that the 
United States would not oppose Vietnam-bound aid from international financial 
institutions. Then, all economic sanctions against Vietnam were lifted by the Clinton 
Administration on February 3, 1994. On July 11, 1995, former President Clinton made an 
official statement to normalize diplomatic relations with Vietnam.  
Economically, Vietnam officially entered into trading with the U.S by the 
Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) on December 10th, 2001. BTA aimed at lowering tariff 
for Vietnam from 40% down to 4% to widen the U.S market for Vietnamese exports on 
an equal footing with other trading competitors, thus increasing exports from Vietnam to 
the U.S between US$1 billion in 2001 and US$ 5 billion in 2004 while U.S exports to 
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Vietnam doubled. While it is still early to make any concrete assessment because the 
implementation of BTA relies on how the two countries conduct in the decades to come - 
“It takes two to tango” as commented by the former Deputy Secretary of State, Robert B. 
Zoellick during his visit in May 2005 to Vietnam. It is obviously that the BTA has 
positive impacts on the economic development of Vietnam, particularly in the areas of 
trade and investment.  
The BTA significantly improved Vietnam’s business environment, ecouraging 
more US-related FDI, and also encouraged non-U.S. FDI, especially in factories 
to produce apparel, footwear, furniture, seafood, and other products to be
exported to the huge U.S. market. In 2004, U.S.-related FDI accounted for 20% 
of FDI into Vietnam.33. 
 
The trading relations between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the United 
States were also indicated in Remarks by U.S Secretary of Commerce Carlos M. 
Gutierrez at the seminar jointly organized by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam 
Chamber of Commerce & Industry (VCCI), and US-Vietnam Friendship Society on 
November 6, 2007, illustrated as below: 
 
The United States is Vietnam’s top export market, and an important source of 
investment. And Vietnam is one of America’s fastest growing markets in Asia. 
During the first eight months of this year, U.S. exports to Vietnam grew 67 
percent. It is estimated that our two-way trade will surpass $12 billion this year. 
Additionally, the BTA gave impetus to domestic reforms such as the Ent rprise 
Law, which liberalized the domestic private sector. It unleash d hundreds of 
thousands of private businesses. And it created millions of jobs, effectively 
helping the domestic non-state sector eclipse the state sector.   
 
With these developments, the U.S. has proved a key counterpart of Vietnam into 
the process of integrating into the world. In this sense, the political leaders of Vietnam 
                                                
33 Source: American Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam – Ho Chi Minh City Chapter 
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have been patient and concessionary enough to deal with the U.S. For example, the main 
obstacle to full WTO membership of Vietnam was a U.S. Congressional delay in granting 
Vietnam Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) also known as “Most-Favored 
Nation” (MFN)34 status. In May 2006, the two countries signed a bilateral market cc ss 
agreement, the last of twenty-eight trade agreements Vietnam had to negotiate with the 
other WTO members to gain membership. Although these types of trade agreements do 
not normally necessitate approval from Congress, then U.S President was barred from 
granting Vietnam PNTR status for Vietnam is a communist state prohibited from such 
status under a 1974 trade act.  
With a new direction in foreign policy, Vietnam had made significant achievements in 
clearing all obstacles, as shown in the issue of Cambodia and the normalizations of 
relations with China and the United States, and other Western countries fo  economic 
development and human development.  Since the major obstacles were removed, 






                                                
34 Most favoured nation (MFN), also called Normal Trade Relations in the United States, is a status 
awarded by one nation to another in international trade. It means that the receiving nation will be granted 
all trade advantages — such as low tariffs — that any other nation also receives. In effect, a nation with 





Chapter 4 - The Global Integration Period from 1995 to 2005 and 
Achievements in Economic Development and Human Development 
As set in the resolution of the Sixth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party 
(December 1986), Vietnam is keen to open markets to the regional and global economies. 
The country has made very important steps in engaging the world fr m economic 
perspectives as seen from its economic relations with ASEAN, Asia-Pacific Forum for 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), and WTO for economic development. High levels of 
economic interdependence, most notably trade flows, the complementarities of 
economics and policies, the availability of compensatory mechanisms for integration in 
developing countries, and the desire to attract foreign investment through creation of a 
larger market are commonly linked to regional economic initiatives35.  
4.1. Achievements in economic development 
From the economic point of view, Vietnam is on the right path for ec nomic 
development as illustrated in trade liberalization, foreign direct nvestment, privatization, 
structural transformation (structural transformation has been metion d earlier as a 
preparation for Vietnam to join the global economy) , and official development 
assistance.  
4.1.1. Trade Liberalization 
Free trade can be an engine of economic growth. For an overview of how ree 
trade brings about benefits to economic development, let us see the traditional arguments 
as outlined: (1) The theory of absolute advantage by Adams Smith suggests that countries 
                                                
35 Margaret  P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst “International Organizations – The Politics and Processes of 
Global Governance” Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2004, p.150 
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differ in their ability to produce goods efficiently. The theory suggests that a country 
should specialize in producing goods in areas where it has an absolute advantage and 
import goods in areas where other countries have absolute advantages; (2) The theory of 
comparative advantage by David Ricardo suggests that it makes sense for a country to 
specialize in producing those goods that it can produce most efficiently, while buying 
goods that it can produce relatively less efficiently from other countries even if that 
means buying goods from other countries that it could produce more efficiently itself. 
The theory of comparative advantage also suggests that unrestricted f ee trade brings 
about increased world production; that is, that trade is a positive-sum game. The theory of 
comparative advantage also suggests that opening a country to free trade stimulates 
economic growth, which creates dynamic gains from trade. The empirical evidence 
seems to be consistent with this claim; and (3) The Heckscher-Olin theory argues that 
the pattern of international trade is determined by differences in factor endowments. It 
predicts that countries will export those goods that make intensive use of locally 
abundant factors and will import goods that make intensive use of factrs that are locally 
scarce36.  
Paul Samuelson extended H-O Theorem also argues that after trade, country’s 
abundant factor of production will benefit, and scare factor production wll lose. Trade 
gives a higher benefit to country’s abundant factor of production. Since developing 
countries have abundant labor, a mutually beneficial trade can occur if they specialize in 
labor intensive goods and export them to the rest of the world. By doingthis, they would 
experience higher rate and/or higher labor employment.  
                                                
36 http://highered.mcgraw hill.com/sites/0072470534/student_view0/chapter4/chapter_summary.htm 
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As a member of the Soviet Bloc before 1986, Vietnam’s international trade was 
limited to Commodity Exchange Program with Socialist member countries with high 
tariffs and numerous non-tariff barriers to govern these trade activities. In order to have 
more trade activities, as an important part of the Vietnamese economy, Vietnam has 
implemented trade liberalization, including tariff reductions and other measures designed 
to relax import and export restrictions, particularly Decision 46 by the then Prime 
Minister, coming into effect in May 2001, has led to a reduction in non-tariff barriers and 
more transparent and predictable import and export regulations.  
Furthermore, trade liberalization has been seen from bilateral and multilateral 
trade agreements with regional and international countries Vietnam has been engaging 
for principal exports as agricultural products, marine products, crude oil, rubbers, coffee, 
shoes, and garments and for main imports as machinery and equipment, petroleum 
products, fertilizers, steel products.  As a result of trade liberalization, Vietnam’s foreign 
trading activities have been expanding rapidly since 1990. Exports grew at an average 
annual rate of 24.7% for the period from 1990 to 2001. Total exports reached US$ 15,027 
million in 2001 and total imports reached US$ 16,200 million in the same year. Within 
the last few years, for example, as in 2004, crude oil was the leading export – increasing 
by 33.5% in spite of a decrease in volume of 7.2%. In the first ten months of 2005, 
exports grew by 22% compared to imports growing at 18.3%. In addition to the 
percentage growth of Vietnam’s exporting and importing activities, the structure of 
Vietnamese exports has changed remarkably in recent years. The U.S, EU and China 
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increased their share of Vietnamese exports by about 50% since 2001 with smaller shares 
of intra-ASEAN trade and exports to East Asia.  
At the bilateral level, Vietnam signed a number of trade agreements with more 
than 60 countries; including the significant bilateral agreement with the United States of 
America taking effect in December 2001. At the regional and international levels, 
Vietnam agreed to participate in ASEAN, APEC, and WTO as the three major regional 
and global economic institutions for further economic development.  Vietnam’s 






















Source: Regional Outlook Forum 2006 – Singapore. Paper on Vietnam Economic Update 
from 2006 and Prospects to 2010 prepared by Dr.Adam McCArty.  
Figure 2 Exports to China 





As argued by the Neoclassical model that economic growth can be exogenous, 
dependent on international trade, Vietnam has been successful in expanding more trading 
activities to the rest of the world thanks to the “Doi Moi” Process, and economic 
development is traditionally measured by Gross Domestic Product. This is further 









Source: Investment Climate Assessment Vietnam 2006 as a part of the Presentation by Mme Pham Chi 
Lan, Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister of Vietnam for the Prime Minister’s Research Commission, at 
Workshop on Investment Climate and Foreign Direct Investment in CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, 
and Vietnam) Countries, hosted by Private Sector Development – the World Bank.   
 
According to the figure, there was a decline in Real GDP Growth Rate from 1997 
to 1999 due partly to the Asian Economic Crisis. Vietnam, however, thereafter did regain 
its Real GDP Growth Rate from 7.0 to 7.5 from 2001 to 2005. In parallel with more 
trading activities with the rest of the world, Vietnam has adopted foreign direct 
investment policy for economic development. 
Figure 4 Annual Real GDP Growth (%) from 1995 to 2005 
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4.1.2. Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam 
According to the Neoclassical Model, Robert Solow argues that output growth 
results from one or more of the three factors: increase in labor quantity and quality 
(through population growth and education), increase in capital (through saving nd 
investment), and improvements in technology. To apply this growth argument to 
Vietnam’s economic development, it is in line with the roles played by Vietnam’s policy 
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to: (1) Constitute important dded resources for 
national economic development; (2) Help improve the technological leve of domestic 
enterprises; and  (3) Help create jobs and develop the human resources.  
The first Law on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Vietnam was p ssed by the 
National Assembly (NA) on December 29th, 1987 and went through amendments in 
1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, with the forms of business-cooperation contract, joint-venture, 
100%-foreign ownership in addition to Export Processing Zone (EPZs), Industrial Parks 
(IPs), Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Transfer-Operat  (BTO), and Build-Transfer 
(BT).  Particularly, the new Investment Law which was passed and c me into effect on 
July 1st 2006 has created more favorable conditions as a means of  adaptability o the 
investment climate of the country with more incentives and relax in licensing procedures 
to attract foreign investors, such as reducing land rental fee t 0.18 – 1.08 US$/m2/year in 
suburban areas in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City; keeping  utilities supply cost  down at 
US$ 0.086 to US$ 0.105  for office use;  especially offering freedom to repatriate profit 
after completing all stipulated obligation with the government (tax rate at 0%); and fixing 
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licensing procedures at not more than 60 working days, including registration and 
evaluation of investment.  
Since 1998, as a consequence, FDI inflows into Vietnam have been very 
encouraging and regarded as a momentum for the country to make a smooth transition 
from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented economy with an annually 
significant increase from US$0.32billion in 1988 to nearly US$ 6.3 billion as committed 
in 2005 , thus creating about 1 million jobs, contributing US$ 1 billion  to the State 
Budget  while at the same time enhancing management skills and modern technology in 
use and restructuring  economy towards  industrialization and modernizatio  regardless 
of “ups-and-downs” with “downs” partly due to the regional financial risis 1990s, in 
attracting FDI and of “the gap” between FDI commitments (regist red capital) and 
disbursements  (realized capital) -  the investment inflows are usually higher than the 
investment disbursements. 
 
Figure 5 Investment Inflows from 1988 to 2005 
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The figure above shows the overall trend of FDI inflows in Vietnam for the period 
of 1988 - 2005.Together with the number of investment projects, the amount of registered 
capital for licensed projects increased rapidly in the first half of the 1990s, which was 
generally referred to as the ‘investment boom’ period in Vietnam. Compared to the 
dramatic increase in registered capital, actual implementation remained far lower. The 
amount of registered capital peaked in the 1995 and 1996 and dropped sharply 
subsequently when the Asian economic crisis began to seriously impact on Vietnam. The 
FDI inflow started to pick up again as countries in the region recovered from the crisis 
and together with the signing of the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trde Agreement. Although 
not shown here in the above Figure, the trend of FDI inflow in Vietnam surges again with 
the accession of the country into the WTO. According to recently released statistics by 
the Government Statistical Office (GSO, 2006), 797 FDI projects with a total registered 
capital of US$ 7.57 billion were licensed in 2006 across 43 provinces in the country. In 
the first three month in 2007, the result was even more spectacular with over 300 FDI 
projects and US$ 2.5 billion registered capital37.  
In addition, the geographical and distributions of FDI by sector have also been 
improved. At the early days, FDI projects were usually carried out in such key economic 
areas with adequate infrastructure facilities and favorable administrative procedures as 
Ho Chi Minh City, Dong Nai province, Binh Duong province,  and Ba Ria – Vung Tau 
province in the South, and Ha Noi Capital, Hai Duong province, Vinh Phuc province, Hai 
                                                
37 Foreign direct investment in Vietnam: An overview and analysis the determinants of spatial distribution 
across provinces by Nguyen, Ngoc Anh and Nguyen, Thang - Development and Policies Research Center - 





Phong province, and Quang Ninh province in the North, FDI projects are now spreading 
out to other areas too, such as centrally-administered cities of  Can Tho in the South, Da 
Nang in the Centre as a result of improvements in infrastructures and the decentralization 
policy of the government. FDI projects by sector have been also diversif ed, albeit at a 
modest percentage, from industrial sector to service sector and agricultural sector. 
According to official statistics released by Foreign Investmnt Agency – the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment of Vietnam, the distribution of FDI projects by ector for the 
1988 – April 2006 are as follows: (1) Industry and Construction: 4,255 projects, 
accounting for 61%; (2) Agriculture, forestry, and fishery:  798 projects, accounting for 







According to official statistics by the Government Statistical Office (GSO) and 
MPI, all 64  provinces in Vietnam have received FDI though  uneven. As shown in 
Figure 7, the South East region (covering Ho Chi Minh city and its surrounding 
provinces) accounts for the largest share of FDI. In the North, Hanoi and neighboring 
provinces account for the send largest share of FDI, leaving a very small proportion for 
other regions. This pattern is due to the fact that Hanoi and Ho Chi Min  City are the two 
Figure 6 Distributions of FDI Projects By Sector 
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main economic hubs of the country. The concentration of FDI in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City has been attributed to the increased cost of living and doing business in the two 
cities. This has led to a tendency that foreign investors are looking elsewhere for the 
investment location. In addition, the local governments in these provinces have now 
realized the importance of FDI and are actively attracting inward FDI in their respective 
regions/provinces. 
Figure 7 Regional FDI by number of projects and register capital 
Source: Foreign direct investment in Vietnam: An overview and analysis the
determinants of spatial distribution across provinces by Nguyen, Ngoc Anh and Nguyen, 
Thang - Development and Policies Research Center - 10 June 20. 
Available: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1921/1/MPRA_paper_1921.pdf 
 
Furthermore, the climate of investment in Vietnam with more incntives has been 
attracting foreign investments from wider regions than South East Asia as compared to 
that at  the very beginning.  The following table provides more information on the 
development of FDI, regarding capital commitments and disbursements as well as 
country classification.  
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Also, from the table below, Taiwan ranks 1st for foreign investors in Vietnam with 
1,465 projects at US$ 2,757,467,536 as realized capital while Malaysia ranks 10th with 
189 projects at US$ 816,167,420 as realized capital.  
Table 5 Top Ten Foreign Investors in the Period 1988 – 4/2006 (Projects in operation) 










01 Taiwan 1,465 7,909,737,514 3,442,195,304 2,757,467,536 
02 Singapore 410 7,700,122,233 2,866,013,367  3,454,289,236 
03  Japan 642 6,731,989,233 3,053,044,739 4,158,985,2381 
04 South Korea 1,125 5,787,353,991 2,418,135,982 2,355,148,236 
05 Hong Kong 365 4,361,848,910 1,695,540,203 1,883,945,651 
06 British Virgin 
Islands 
260 2,766,568,591 1,038,768,597 1,228,728,662 
07 France 170 2,188,897,993 1,332,391,280 1,044,194,345 
08 Holland 62 2,014,219,210 1,243,770,774 1,746,292,712 
09 USA 279 1,874,158,897 1,091,620,293 724,400,074 
10 Malaysia 189 1,578,252,072 712,343,595 816,167,426 
 Sum up 4,967 42,913,148,788 18,893,824,134 20,169,619,668 
 Others 1,293 10,560,209,570 4,753,112,831 5,409,348,678 
 Total 6,260 53,473,358,358 23,646,936,965 25,578,968,346  
 
Source: Presentation on Business and Investment in Vietnam by Dr. Nguyen Thi Bich 
Van – Deputy Director General of Foreign Investment Agency – The Ministry of 
Planning and Investment of Vietnam.  
 
As empirically presented above, FDI inflows in Vietnam are estimated as a means 
to meet the requirement capital as well as to transfer new technologies during their 
transitional periods as argued by the Neoclassical model that the country is further 
promoting FDI for the sectors in high technology and information technology, new 
materials and new energy, vegetation and live stock breeding, farming and processing 
agricultural, forestry, and aqua-cultural products, infrastructure dev lopment, healthcare 
and education. Take the excellent example of Intel Cooperation U.S.A with its expansion 
in capital up to US$ 1 billion from its original capital at US$ 300 million as announced in 
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Nov 2006 for the Ho Chi Minh City-based factory38. Therefore, FDI has a positive impact 
on economic growth of Vietnam with capital and employment factors combined.  
Regardless of the current global financial crisis, Vietnam reains a stable 
environment for FDI as Prime Minister (PM) Nguyen Tan Dung made  statement at 
Boao Forum for Asia39 as follows: 
Vietnam will remain a dynamic economy and stable destination for investors, 
despite the global financial crisis, said Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung at the 
Bo’ao Forum for Asia (BFA) in China last week. The PM said Vietnam had 
grown 6.2 percent in 2008, down from 8.2 percent in 2007, and has political and 
economic stability that is a strong base for inward investors. In 2008, foreign 
direct investment reached US$64 billion, three times more than in 2007. 
Addressing the closing event of the three-day summit on April 19 in Hai an 
Province, PM Dung asserted that “The BFA is an ideal setting for Asian 
politicians, academics and businesspeople to share experiences a d ideas for 
effective regional cooperation. Asia’s traditional values, lesons learnt from the 
East Asia economic crisis in the late 1990s, and strong determination would help 
the region to become a “new driving force” for the world’s economic 
development, said PM Dung. In order to improve the economic situation, 
Vietnam will closely work with Asian to boost regional cooperation, especially in 
                                                
38 Source: http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/releases/20061110corp.htm 
39 Boao Forum for Asia (Chinese: 博鳌亚洲论坛; pinyin: Bó'áo Yàzhōu Lùntán), abbreviated as BFA, is a 
non-governmental, not-for-profit international organization modelled after the World Economic Forum in 
Davos, Switzerland. As a non-government, non-profit international organization, Boao Forum For Asia 
(BFA) is a prestigious forum for leaders in government, business and academia in Asia and other continents 
to share visions on the most pressing issues in this dynamic region and the world at large. The Forum is 
committed to promoting regional economic integration and bringing Asian countries even closer to their 
development goals. Initiated in 1998 by Fidel V. Ramos, former President of the Philippines, Bob Hawke, 
former Prime Minister of Australia, and Morihiro Hos kawa, former Prime Minister of Japan, Boao Forum 
for Asia was formally inaugurated in February 2001. The founding of BFA was driven by the People's 
Republic of China and founded by 26 Australasian state  on 27 February 2001. The organisation held its 
first meeting from April 12-13, 2002. It has its fixed address in Bo'ao, Hainan, China, although the 
Secretariat is based in Beijing. The BFA holds a high-level annual forum for government, business, experts, 
and scholars at Boao, with the focus of discussion on economics, integration, cooperation, society, and
environment. 




the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS). It will speed up the construction of 
economic corridors and help realize the GMS Agreement on cross-border 
transportation40. 
 
As argued by the Neo-classical model, privatization is another area for developing 
countries to rely on achieving economic growth. How does Vietnam carry out the process 
of privatization?  
4.1.3. Privatization   
As mentioned earlier, Vietnam has realized the importance on privatization 
attached to economic development. Vietnam has shown its positive manner in the process 
of facilitating the development of privately-owned enterprises (POE) and reforming state-









As stated in “An Informal Economic Report of the World Bank Consultative 
Meeting Group for Vietnam, Ha Noi, December 14-15, 1999”, there were some key 
factors about the Private Sector in Vietnam : The share of the private sector in total GDP 
                                                
40 Available at : http://www.vietnewsonline.vn/News/Politics/5883/Vietnam-PM-reassures-foreign-
investors.htm 
Table 6 Private Sector’s Share in 1998 GDP (Percent) 
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in 1999 was 51%. During the 1995 – 1998 period, the domestic private sector grw at 9% 
per year. Less than half of manufacturing GDP was produced by private firms, but the 
share was increasing, with the domestic private sector dominating that share. Private 
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) in manufacturing, especially the larger 
ones, were highly export-oriented. Foreign invested enterprises had an important role to 
play for economic development by employing 300,000 workers.  The domestic private 
sector was by far the most labor-intensive. Under this condition, Vietnam had been 
actively carrying out the development of its private sector with very encouraging results: 
(1) For six years of development, there were 180.000 new enterprises being established 
with capital of US$ 15 billion from 2000 to 2005; (2) The number of private en rprises 
registered for export-import trade was increased by 5 times up to 20,000 by 2005; (3) 
Private sector still enjoyed the highest growth and increasing hares in the national 







The Enterprise Law, taking effect in 1999, has also been amended quit  a number 
of times. It has been improved a lot with business registration simplified considerably  by 
abolishing thousands of sub-licenses; improving services at business registration offices; 
Figure 8 Industrial Employments by Sector in the period 1997 – 1998 
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clarifying requirements; and disseminating clear information to busines es on their rights 
and obligations in comparison with high costs and complicated process that a potential 
business had to submit 20 different type of documents, get 30 seals, wait for 3 months, 
and pay about US$ 700 for a licensing process in addition to more sub-licenses being 
required for actual activities as applied by the Enterprise Law before 1999.   
Private enterprises, whose activities were negligible in 1993, now account for 
over half of the investments made each year. The equitization process cut the number of 
state-owned enterprises by more than half, from 3786 to 1720, over the past nine years, 
although not across all sectors. This has created increased space for th expansion of 
private firms. Large state-owned enterprises and state-owned commercial banks are now 
lined up for equitization, whereas remaining ownership rights by the s ate are being 
transferred out of ministries and provinces to avoid the conflict of interest between 
ownership and regulation.  As the private sector expands rapidly, both domestic and 
foreign-invested firms have connected solidly with global markets. Private firms now 
contribute 65 percent of manufactured products and over 70 percent of non-oil exports. 
Vietnam is more and more an integral part of international production and distribution 
chains41.  
4.1.4. Official Development Assistance 
The fast-growing economic development of Vietnam is also partly thanks to 
sources of Official Development Assistance, commonly known as ODA. The country has 
been receiving from donor countries and multilateral organizations. Simply put by 
                                                
41 IDA at work: Vietnam – Laying Foundation for Steady Growth “ The private sector has emerged as the 















Pledged ODA 1.86 1.95 2.31 2.43 2.38 2.19 2.15 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.8 3.4 3.7 4.4
Disbursed ODA 0.41 0.72 0.74 0.9 1 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.55 1.4 1.65 1.7 1.8
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Classical and Neo-Classical Theories, ODA is provided to cover thr e gaps: Savings – 
Investment Gap; Foreign Exchange Gap; Technological Gap. ODA has contributed to 
11% of Vietnam’s investment and 17% of government investment: Japanese ODA 
accounted for 28.8% of total committed ODA and 36.2% of disbursed ODA. Japanese 
ODA has contributed to 4% of Vietnam’s investment and 6.2% of governm nt 
investment. Sectoral contribution of ODA includes: Transportation, Power generation, 
Education, Urban Infrastructure and hence helped to attract FDI Factually. Vietnam has 
been receiving a considerable amount of ODA as shown in the below figure42.    
Figure 9 A Glimpse of ODA in Vietnam from 1993 to 2006 
 
In 2007, international donors pledged to offer Vietnam nearly 4.45 billion U.S. 
dollars in official development assistance (ODA), up from 3.7 billion d llars in 2006. 
This time, they have committed a record level of ODA for Vietnam, which "proves the 
close cooperation between the Vietnamese government and donors," Vietnamese Deputy 
Prime Minister Pham Gia Khiem said at the 13th Consultative Group (CG) Meeting, 
                                                
42 Predictability and Stability of ODA Flows - The Case of Vietnam by Dr. Pham Hoang Mai – Head of 
Japan and Northeast Asia Division – Foreign Economic Relations Department – Ministry of Planning and 




adding that the government has pledged to effectively use the financial ssistance. Of the 
pledged amount, 1.14 billion dollars came from the Asian Development Bank, 890 
million dollars from the World Bank, 890.3 million dollars from Japan, and 370.4 million 
dollars from France. Vietnamese Minister of Planning and Investment Vo Hong Phuc 
said Vietnam will use soft loans among the pledged ODA to finance projects on 
developing infrastructure works, including roads, seaports, airports, power plan,  and 
water supplies.  
 Undoubtedly, the above achievements in economic development have come from 
the country’s active participations in the regional and global economic institutions, 
namely: the Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN)43, Asia-Pacific 
Cooperation (APEC)44, and the World Trade Organization (WTO)45. In short, these are 
the factors that have led to economic development.  
                                                
43 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok 
by the five original Member Countries, namely, Indoesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand.  Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar 
on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999.  Asof 2006, the ASEAN region has a population of 
about 560 million, a total area of 4.5 million square kilometers, a combined gross domestic product of 
almost US$ 1,100 billion, and a total trade of about US$ 1,400 billion, available at: 
http://www.asean.org/64.htm.  
 
44 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, or APEC, is thepr mier forum for facilitating economic growth, 
cooperation, trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region .APEC is the only inter governmental 
grouping in the world operating on the basis of non-binding commitments, open dialogue and equal respect 
for the views of all participants. Unlike the WTO or ther multilateral trade bodies, APEC has no treaty 
obligations required of its participants. Decisions made within APEC are reached by consensus and 
commitments are undertaken on a voluntary basis. APEC has 21 members - referred to as "Member 
Economies" - which account for approximately 40.5%1 of the world's population, approximately 54.2%1 of 
world GDP and about 43.7%2 of world trade. APEC's 21 Member Economies are Australia; Brunei 
Darussalam; Canada; Chile; People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of 
Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; The Republic of the Philippines; The 
Russian Federation; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; United States of America; Viet Nam, available 
at: http://www.apec.org/apec/about_apec.html 
45 The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the 
rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of 
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4.2 Joining ASEAN 
With the withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteer troops from Cambodia in 
September 1989, and the conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords in October 1991, the 
normalization of relations between ASEAN and Vietnam proceeded. Dtecting genuine 
changes in Hanoi’s domestic and international priorities, ASEAN becam  more proactive 
in engaging Vietnam with a view to admitting the country into the ranks of the 
organization. In 1991, for example, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad stated 
that differences in socio-political systems between Vietnam and the ASEAN states would 
not prevent it from joining the Association. ASEAN countries thought that it was 
necessary to bring Vietnam into the organization in due course for the below reasons.  
Firstly, with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Sovit Un on, 
it seemed an appropriate time to reach out to its erstwhile opponent and end the 
ideological divisions engendered by the Cold War. From 1991 (the year the Soviet Union 
collapsed) to 1995 (the year Vietnam joined ASEAN), Vietnam managed to find new 
sources of aid, trade and investment to replace that lost from the Sovi t bloc, when 
Vietnam faced severe economic difficulties and resultant political ch llenges to regime 
legitimacy, and when the ASEAN states’ economic success stories had become widely 
apparent, the Vietnamese leadership was more willing to accept new thinking and learn 
from non-socialist developmental models. As a result, joining ASEAN would facilitate a 
                                                                                                                                                 
the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and 





smooth transition to a market economy. In November 1994, former Deputy Foreign 
Minister Vu Khoan wrote as follows: 
 
With the October 1991 Paris Agreement on the overall political solution to the 
Cambodia problem, the key obstacles to Vietnam-ASEAN relations over the last 
10 years was removed. Relations between Vietnam and ASEAN members could 
thus rapidly develop bilaterally and multilaterally. In other words, membership of 
ASEAN did not radically alter the dynamics of Vietnam-ASEAN cooperation46. 
 
According to Gareth Porter47, former Foreign Minister of Vietnam, Nguyen Co 
Thach,  was among the first Vietnamese leaders to study the merits of the market. Porter 
observed that the foreign minister utilized this new knowledge to initiate debate in 
Vietnam on the need for coexistence between capitalist and sociali t systems and 
participation in the global capitalist economy. This led to the adoption of a resolution at 
the Sixth Communist Party of Vietnam’s (CPV) Central Committee Plenum in July 1984 
which officially laid down the task of actively participating in the global capitalist 
system. The resolution continued to serve as one of the most important documents 
concerning the policy of economic reform that was officially adopted by the CPV Sixth 
National Congress in 1986. The CPV Political Report argued: The scientifi  and 
technological revolution, the globalization of production forces, and the emerg nce of a 
single world market are the major characteristics of our era, fo cing all the countries to 
readjust their economies in order to seek and protect their optimal niches in the 
international division of labor. And the internationalization of production forces has led 
to the inevitable need for economic cooperation and peaceful coexistence among 
                                                
46 Nguyen Vu Tung, “ Vietnam’s Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation”, Contemporary 
Southeast Asia Vol. 29, No. 3 (2007), pp. 483–505, © 2007 ISEAS, http://www.viet-
studies.info/kinhte/VN_Asean_JSEAS.pdf 
47 Porter, Gareth. “The Transformation of Vietnam’s Worldview: From Two Camps to Interdependence”. 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 12, no. 1 (June 1990): 1 – 19 
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countries of different political systems48.Vietnam was admitted into this regional bloc as 
an official member in July 1995.  
Secondly, as ASEAN was eager to enlarge the organization to enable it to speak 
for the whole of Southeast Asia, Vietnam seemed to provide a good starting point for the 
subsequent entry of Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. As a result, ASEAN would play a 
pivotal role in ensuring peace, stability and, to a lesser extent, prosperity in Southeast 
Asia and a larger role in the Asia-Pacific region.  
Thirdly, Vietnam’s membership to ASEAN has helped secure the legitimacy of 
the CPV as it has been able to bring about peace, stability and prosperity to Vietnam in 
the aftermath of the Cold War. As Prime Minister of Vietnam, Nguyen Tan Dung,  said,  
 
With the cooperation with ASEAN, we can further consolidate an 
environment of peace and stability, continuously expand multifaceted 
cooperation with regional countries, especially in economic terms, and 
enhance Vietnam’s international standing, creating more conditions for 
Vietnam deeper integration into the Asia Pacific and global economies.  
 
The table below shows trading activities between Vietnam and ASEAN from 1995 to 
200449:
                                                
48  Nguyen Vu Tung, “ Vietnam’s Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation”, Contemporary 
Southeast Asia Vol. 29, No. 3 (2007), pp. 483–505, © 2007 ISEAS, http://www.viet-
studies.info/kinhte/VN_Asean_JSEAS.pdf 
49 Nguyen Vu Tung, “ Vietnam’s Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation”, Contemporary 











Balance of Trade 

















1995 1,112 20.4 2,378 29.1 3,490 23.9 (-1,266) 46.7 
1996 1,364 18.8 2,788 24 4,152 33.4 (-1,424) 36.6 
1997 1,911 20.8 3,166 27.3 5,077 25.5 (-1,255) 52.1 
1998 2,372 25.3 3,749 32.6 6,122 29.7 (-1,377) 64.3 
1999 2,463 21.3 3,288 28 5,751 24.9 (-0,825) 411 
2000 2,612 18 4,519 29 7,131 23.7 (-1,907) 165.2 
2001 2,551 17 4,226 26.1 6,777 21.8 (-1,675) 147.5 
2002 2,426 14.5 4,770 24.2 7,196 19.7 (-2,344) 77.8 
2003 2,958 14.7 5,957 24 8,915 19.8 (-2,999) 62.5 
2004 3,874 14.6 7,766 24.7 11,640 19.8 (-3,892) 81.1 
Source: National Committee for International Economic Cooperation at
http://www.nciec.gov.vn/index.nciec?68 
(3) Vietnam’s exports to ASEAN countries as a percentage of its total foreign 
(5) Vietnam’s imports from ASEAN countries as a percentage of its total imports 
(7) Vietnam’s trade with ASEAN countries as a percentage of total foreign trade 
(9) Vietnam’s trade balance with ASEAN countries as a percentage of total oreign trade.  
 
In 1994, ASEAN countries accounted for 30 per cent of Vietnam’s total f reign 
trade, and 30 per cent of foreign direct investment (FDI). Indeed the level of economic 
interaction between Vietnam and its ASEAN partners shrank after it had joined the 
organization with the onset of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In 2003, trade with 
ASEAN countries dropped to 20 per cent of Vietnam’s total trade. Investments from 
ASEAN in 1997 accounted for 23.4 per cent of total foreign investments in Vietnam. 
This figure fell to 17.6 per cent in 1999 rising to about 20 per cent by 2007. The table 
does not really see the real benefits from joining ASEAN. If we tak  a closer look at the 
agricultural sector, however, Vietnam’s participation in ASEAN shows considerable 
benefits. 
In 2003, Vietnam’s rice exports to ASEAN reached US$388.7 million, accounting 
for 66.4 percent of the total agricultural export value of the country to the region. Coffee, 
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rubber and peanuts were the next largest agricultural exports to ASEAN. Each of them 
accounted for around 6.5-8 percent of the total agricultural export value of th country to 
ASEAN in 2003. The agricultural exports of ASEAN to Vietnam, however, have been 
modest. The country imported agricultural inputs (mainly urea fertiliz ) rather than 
agricultural products. In 2005, Vietnam imported approximately 1.7 million tons of 
fertilizer, in which urea contributed 550,000 tons worth US$ 142 million from ASEAN.  
Vietnam can further expand its agricultural exports to ASEAN after the full 
Common Effective Preferential Tariffs Agreement, CEPT, has been completed, or 
beyond 2010. This is because farm products in the Sensitive List (SL) of many enlarged 
ASEAN countries are major agricultural exports of Vietnam50.  For example, rice is on 
the SL for Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, and the Philippines, while raw and 
primary processed coffee is on the list for Brunei, Laos, Myanmar, M laysia and 
Thailand. As long as tariff rates are reduced ton0-5 percent for these products, export 
opportunities for Vietnam will be widened in ASEAN markets51.   
To conclude, Vietnam has benefited immensely from joining ASEAN and derives 
a great deal of satisfaction from being a member for the following factors: (1) ASEAN is 
a large market with around 500 million people; (2) ASEAN is the region very close in 
terms of geographical distance; (3) The people in the region have similar food 
                                                
50 The CEPT is the mechanism by which tariffs on goods traded within the ASEAN region, which meet a 
40% ASEAN content requirement, will be reduced to 0-5% by the year 2002/2003 (2006 for Vietnam, 
2008 for Laos and Myanmar, and 2010 for Cambodia). The tariff reductions are moving ahead on both the 
"fast" and "normal" tracks. Tariffs on goods in thefast track were largely reduced to 0-5% by 2000. Tariffs 
on goods in the normal track will be reduced to this level by 2002, or 2003 for a small number of products. 
Currently, about 81% of ASEAN's tariff lines are covered by either the fast or normal track, available at: 
http://www.us-asean.org/afta.asp 
51 Tran Van Hoa and Charles Harvie, “ Regional Trade Agreements in ASIA”: Agricultural Issues in an 
Enlarged ASEAN: the case of Vietnam, p.108 – p.116 
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consumption habits; and (4) The average income level in ASEAN countries is not very 
high compared to other regions. More importantly, Vietnam’s membership to ASEAN 
paved the way for the country to join other regional and global economic institutions52.  
4.3 Joining APEC 
Three years after joining ASEAN, Vietnam made another successful move to join 
a larger regional body economically and politically referred to as Asia –Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) in November 1998 and showed itself to be a very active and 
potential member by hosting APEC 2006 Summit in the capital of Hanoi.     
 
APEC member economies are now the largest investors in Vietnam, representing 
65.6% of the total investment capital. Of the 14 countries and territories investing 
more than US$ 1 billion each in Vietnam, 10 are APEC members, with a 
combined investment capital of US$ 39.5 billion, accounting for 62.7% of the 
total investment capital. The biggest official development assistance for Vietnam 
also comes from APEC, with Japan being the largest donor. Up to 72.8% of 
Vietnam's exports come to APEC members. Vietnam's imports from APEC 
member economies are the biggest, worth US$ 25.3 billion, or 79.2% of the total 
import spending. Of more than 2.9 million international tourists coming to 
Vietnam in 2004, 2.2 million came from APEC member economies, accounting 
for 75.7% of the total. The APEC 2006 summit will be the biggest international 
event to be held in Vietnam. The week-long gathering of the leaders of 21 
member economies from November 12 to 19 in Hanoi will be the key activity. 
Vietnam's priorities for APEC 2006 would be APEC's main pillars and would 
also be the continuation of the themes of previous and succeeding summits53.  
 
According to then Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan, Chairman of the APEC 
2006 National Committee, hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum 2006 would serve 
as a valuable opportunity for Vietnam. First, Vietnam would make positive contributions 
to the development of APEC, making it more substantive and efficient. Scond, Vietnam 
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53 http://www.vir.com.vn; http://vibforum.vcci.com.vn; VIR-news and The Saigon Times Weekly on 16th -
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would further nurture an image of dynamism, hospitality and cultural identity of the 
country. Third, through APEC, Vietnam would promote relations with all other APEC 
members and accumulate more support from the forum’s members for the country's bid 
to join the World Trade Organization. In addition, Vietnamese enterpris s would have the 
chance to meet foreign partners and develop business activities54. 
Trade liberalization is the most important content of APEC. As the host country, 
Vietnam would help APEC participate more actively in the process. At the Doha round in 
Hong Kong in 2005, some initial results were attained. However, the round was not yet 
completed. APEC 2006 focused on the Doha negotiations. Though without pre-
determination, APEC 2006 had a certain relation to Vietnam’s accession to WTO.  The 
negotiation on Vietnam's WTO membership was proceeding very well. Vi tnam had just 
concluded the negotiation with New Zealand. Of the APEC members, there remained 
only two members - the US and Mexico - who had yet to conclude WTO bilateral 
negotiations with Vietnam. Progress had also been made recently in the bilateral talks 
with the United States. Hosting APEC 2006 was a driving force for Vietnam in the 
process. In addition, as a less developed country among APEC members, Vietnam 
expected that by developing trade and investment, co-operating in economy, science and 
technology with other APEC members, it could develop faster. The gap between Vietnam 
and other APEC members would be narrowed down. At APEC 2006, Vietnam held major 
international events to further promote the country's image to stimulate foreign 
investment attraction and tourism.  
                                                
54APEC 2006 presents a big opportunity for Vietnam's international integration APEC and Vietnam-APEC 
2006 summit, available at: http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/nr041126171753/ns060509095637 
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4.4 Joining WTO 
Joining APEC actually was not a final goal for Vietnam to fully integrate into the 
world’s economy.  In order to trade further, Vietnam participated in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) as the 150th member on November, 7th, 2006 after more than ten 
years of negotiations with other active members of the body. This is the only way out for 
Vietnam to freely trade with the rest of the world as Dr. Vo, Tng Xuan, President of An 
Giang University, Long Xuyen, Vietnam, has indicated that joining the world trade body 
will create opportunities for the agricultural sector, the industrial sector, and the service 
sector to have  further access to the world market.  More FDI projects will be operated in 
industrial and manufacturing establishments nationwide. More foreign-based service 
industries in such fields as information and communications technology, advertising, 
foreign financial services, and advisory and auditing services will be established55.   
WTO accession can be expected to facilitate further global integration over the 
medium term, improving Vietnamese exporters’ access to foreign markets. This should 
be particularly beneficial for the key textile and footwear export industries because 
Vietnam can now compete on an equal footing with other WTO member countries on 
these industries. The benefits to export performance, however, could take some time to be 
fully realized… Import barriers in most other sectors will also decline, albeit in a more 
gradual fashion. Vietnam has committed to bound tariff rates on most pr ducts ranging 
from zero to 35 percent, although tariffs on cars and motorbikes are to remain somewhat 
higher, and certain sensitive products (such as eggs, tobacco, sugar, and salt) will be 
                                                




further protected with tariff quotas. Reductions in most bound rates— from 17.4 percent 
on average in 2007 to 13.6 percent by 2019—are to be phased in over periods of up to 12
years56.    
From a broader perspective, WTO accession should have largely positive 
macroeconomic effects. While the reduction in import tariffs can be expected initially to 
lower import duty receipts by some 0.3 to 0.6 percent of GDP, this should be tempered 
over time as the removal of trade barriers spurs import growth. Wit  exports continuing 
to grow rapidly as access to foreign markets improves, and with continued dynamism of 
foreign investment, the overall balance of payments should remain stro g. Increasing 
access to cheaper imports should also help contain inflation, which, at 7.5 percent in 
2006, is still higher than in other emerging markets in Asia. IMF staff estimates 
(Tumbarello, 2007) also point to welfare gains from trade liberalization, rising over time 
to reach some 0.6–1.2 percent of GDP a year by 2019.  
Vietnam is also likely to derive important productivity gains from trade 
liberalization and other market-friendly reforms to be introduced in the context of WTO 
accession. A new law providing a common regulatory framework for domestic and 
foreign enterprises has been introduced, and Vietnam has also moved to harm nize its 
rules on trading rights for foreign and domestic traders. WTO accession could also serve 
as a catalyst to promote restructuring of unprofitable state-owned e terprises (SOEs). 
Increased competition with foreign banks can also be expected to prod the government to 
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speed up the restructuring of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and the 
implementation of its banking sector reform roadmap. These reforms should help 
increase the efficiency and profitability of investment. Indeed, the prospect of accession 
has already bolstered the investment climate, and. With FDI approvals reaching a record 
$10 billion in 2006, Vietnam was well-placed to take full advantage of its ongoing global 
integration to sustain the rapid pace of its economic growth.  
WTO accession is, of course, not a panacea and presents challenges as w ll as 
opportunities. Heavily-protected industries and SOE sectors, notably auto-assembly and 
motorbike plants, and the financial sector, will need to undertake significant reforms to 
remain viable. In this process, there may be a compression of profit margins and, 
possibly, labor-shedding or even bankruptcies in loss-making SOEs and declining 
industries. Although adverse effects should be manageable as long as more efficient 
sectors offer growing employment opportunities, it will be important to put in place 
adequate retraining programs and social safety nets to minimize dislocations.  
The authorities will also need to resist the temptation to support financially those 
industries with declining profitability. Such support, which could take the form of fiscal 
incentives or directed lending by state-owned banks, could turn out to be very costly 
especially if, in the end, these industries are found to be non-viable. The below figure 
serves as an illustration for Vietnamese economic perspectives from joining the world 












Source: Regional and Economic Outlook for Asia and Pacific – Issue April 2007 – IMF 
Vietnam’s participation in the world trade body has significant impacts on the 
region, and the rest of the world as thoroughly analyzed in “ Regional and Economic 
Outlook for Asia and Pacific – Issue April 2007 – IMF”57 as below:  
For the region, the NIEs58 are likely to gain from Vietnam’s accession, as they 
have invested heavily in the country and do not have the same comparative dvantage as 
Vietnam in their exports. However, major exporters of textiles and garments (such as 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka) may face new competitive 
challenges as the end of the textile quota implies increased market access of Vietnamese 
products in the United States. In addition, as Vietnamese producers penetrate a broader 
range of manufacturing sectors, including low-end electronics, the rest of the ASEAN-559 
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International Monetary Fund, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2007/APD/ENG/areo0407.pdf 
 
58 “Newly industrialized economies (NIEs)” refers to Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan 
Province of China. 
59 “ASEAN-5” refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philipp nes, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
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are likely to come under increasing pressure to move towards the production of higher 
value-added products. With respect to foreign investment, it is difficult to ascertain how 
WTO membership will affect FDI in other Asian countries. Vietnam has already 
established itself as an appealing destination for foreign investors prior to accession, 
including in the information technology sector. Also, the reduction of its MFN tariffs, 
together with improved access to foreign markets, should enhance its integration into 
regional production networks. Cost reductions from increasing FDI in Vietnam could 
thus improve the profitability of regional networks. 
For the rest of the world, industrial countries are likely to accrue onsiderable net 
gains from Vietnam’s WTO accession. Consumers in the United States, European Union 
(EU), and Japan60 can be expected to reap growing gains in welfare from the continui g 
integration of Vietnam’s productive and low-cost labor force into the global economy. In 
addition, as Vietnam transitions towards middle income status, there s ould be increasing 
scope for an expansion of industrial countries’ exports in technology intens ve 
manufactures and high-end services (e.g., finance), in which advanced economies still 
have a comparative advantage. While preliminary data suggest that, in the short run, FDI 
is set to increase most strongly in the sectors in which import bar iers will fall most 
rapidly (as in textiles), over time, it is likely that there will also be growing foreign 
investor interest in higher-value-added manufacturing and services sectors. 
 
The above foreign policy with trading activities has brought significant impacts 
on both economic development and human development of Vietnam as theoretically 
                                                




applied from  some of the most relevant frameworks from the literature “ Overview – 
Attacking Poverty: Opportunity, Empowerment, and Security”,  concretely:  (1) A 
strategy for poverty reduction - In the way of promoting opportunity w h the emphasize 
placed on the centrality of materials, including jobs, credit, roads, electricity, markets for 
their produce, and the schools, water, sanitation, and health services that underpin the 
health and skills essential for work; (2) From strategy to action – Developing countries 
need to prepare their own mix of policies to reduce poverty, reflecting national priorities 
and local realities. Choices will depend on the economic, sociopolitical, structural, and 
cultural context of individual countries – indeed, individual communities; (3) Expanding 
into international markets – International markets offer huge opportunities for jobs and 
income growth – in agriculture, industry, and services. All countries had major reductions 
in income poverty have made use of international trade”61.  
4.5 Achievements in Human Development 
Vietnam has been keen to work closely with multilateral internatio l 
development agencies, such as IMF, WB, and UNDP for human development. In this
sense, poverty reduction, education development, and health development have emerg d 
as major tasks for human development of Vietnam. Especially, education and health are 
the two basic objectives of development; they are important ends in themselves. Health is 
central to well-being, and education is essential for a satisfying and rewarding life; both 
are fundamental to the broader notion of expanded human capacities that lie at the heart 
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of the meaning of development. At the same time, education plays a key role in the 
ability of developing country to absorb modern technology and to develop the capacity 
for self-sustaining growth and development. Moreover, health is a prerequisit  for 
increases in productivity, while successful education relies on adequ te health as well. 
Thus both health and education can also be seen as vital components of growth and 
development62.   
This part of the thesis presents how Vietnam has been able to achieve poverty 
reduction, education development, and health development by working closely with and 
receiving strong supports from the UN development agencies for Vietnam’s national 
development plans in these sectors.  
4.5.1 Poverty reduction 
Regardless of achievements in economic development as well presented above, 
Vietnam remains a poor country with low per capita income (per capita GDP is estimated 
at about US$400 in the year 2000) and the poverty rate is still high. The Gov rnment of 
Vietnam recognizes this problem and believes that a strategy focused on achieving high 
and sustainable growth is a key to narrowing the economic development gap between 
Vietnam and other countries in the region and the world, while at the same time 
generating sufficient resources to raise the welfare and living standards of the people, as 
well as reduce poverty and create social equity. In order to maintain rapid and sustainable 
economic growth, and implement effectively the policy on poverty reduction, the 
                                                




Government of Vietnam developed the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Strategy (CPRGS). 
CPRGS is an action program that translates the Government’s Ten-Year Socio-
economic Development Strategy, Five-Year Socio-economic Development Pla  as well 
as other sectoral development plans into concrete measures with well-defined road maps 
for implementation. The purpose of CPRGS is to achieve economic growth and poverty 
reduction objectives. CPRGS is closely related to the national annual socio-economic 
development plans and those plans developed by different ministries, ag ncies and 
sectors. The national annual socio-economic development plan that is passed by the 
National Assembly serves as a tool for bringing the policies and measures contained in 
the CPRGS into practice63. This CPRGS, approved by former Prime Minister Phan Van 
Khai in November 2003, covers all general objectives, institutional arrangements, 
policies and solutions of the 10-Year Strategy and 5- Year Plan into detailed specific 
actions plans. In policy, the CPRGS has the following six parts: 
Part I: Socio-Economic Setting, Current Poverty Situation, Achievements and 
Challenges. 
Part II: Objectives and Tasks of Socio – Economic Development and Poverty Reduction 
for the Period up to 2005 and 2010. 
Part III: Create Environment for Rapid and Sustainable Growth, and for Poverty 
Reduction. 
Part IV: Large-scale Infrastructure Development for Growth and Reduction of Poverty. 
Part V: Major Policies and Measures for the Development of Sectors and Industries to 
Ensure Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Growth. 
Part VI: Mobilization of Resources for Growth and Poverty Reduction.  
  
By definition of the World Bank, those living less than $US 1 per day are 
considered as poor. More specifically, it is measured in dollars with the same purchasing 
                                                




power as in the US, commonly known as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). However, 
poverty line in Vietnam cannot be based on this estimation, for goods and ervices are 
more expensive in the U.S. than those in Vietnam. In comparison, this measurement of 
$US 1 per day is equivalent to 1/5 or 20 cents of a dollar. In fact, a new poverty line 
developed by the National Poverty Reduction Program is defined at different levels 
subject to specific areas/regions and to per capita income: VND 80,000 per month for 
island areas and rural mountainous areas, VND 100,000 per month for rural plain are s, 
and VND 150,000 per month in urban areas   for 2001 – 2005 period (note: $US 1 
equivalent to VND 16,000 – exchange rate by Vietcombank). Poverty line in Viet am 
was 58.1% in 1993.  
The CPRGS of Vietnam requires a very large amount of government sp ding 
and other capital inflows from international borrowers and multilateral donors. To this 
end, the country has been working closely with the World Bank and the In ernational 
Monetary Fund as agencies for development in the fight against poverty.  
 Since resuming its operations in the country in 1993, the Bank has provided thre  
types of services to Vietnam: (1) design and finance development projects; (2) analytical 
work, policy advice, and technical assistance; and (3) donor dialogue facilitator. As of 
today, the Bank   has supported more than 50 projects to help Vietnam fight poverty 
through finance for agriculture, infrastructure, health programs, schools, and other 
essential needs. 
This part of the thesis, however, discusses only one part of the Bank’s projects to 
Vietnam through Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) in support of the country’s 
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Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy. Initially, PRSCs supported 
important reforms of Vietnam in trade integration with the global economy, private sector 
development and public finance management reform. The PRSCs have become the main 
vehicle for the Government and the donor community to discuss a wide range of policy 
reforms. The PRSCs not only concentrate on poverty reduction but also help Vietnam in 
a broad-based program to deal with difficulties faced by the country in transition to a 
market-based economy.  In this connection, the country has been receiving in seven 
PRSCs from the Bank. Given below is a brief description of the 7 PRSCs. 
Table 8: The Brief Description of the 7 Poverty Reduction Support Credits 
Project(s) Amount Objectives/Benefits  
PRSC 1  
(June 2001) 
US$ 250 million - Improve the climate for the private sector, 
thereby generating jobs and higher wages; 
- Reform State enterprises to improve efficiency 
and  free up fiscal resources for poverty reduction 
program;  
- Reconstruct the banking system to reduce the 
risk of financial crisis, which could otherwise 
undermine poverty reduction efforts; 
- Integrate with the world economy to expand 
labor-intensive  exports; and 
- Improve public expenditure management 
PRSC 2  
(June 2003) 
No-interest Loan 
US$ 100 million  - Strengthen competition in the economy, harden 
the budget constraint on state-owned enterprises, 
and level the playing field for the private sector, 
therefore leading to increased efficiency and job 
creation; 
- Promote investments in  people through access 
by the poor to health care, more secure asset 
ownership in the form of land titles and greater 
role of the public involvement in environment 
management; and 
- Increase efficiency and accountability in public 
financial management and improve legal 
transparency and accessibility, thus laying the 
foundations for modern governance. 
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PRSC 3  
(June 2004)  
No-interest Loan 
 
US$ 100 million  Help further reforms set out in the country’s 
CPRGS in a plan to complete the transition to a 
market economy; make development inclusive, 
and to build a modern governance system.  
PRSC 4  
(June 2005) 
US$ 100 million  Support  the country’s broad-based reform 
program, including completion of the transition to 
a market economy, ensuring social inclusion and 
strengthening governance.  
PRSC 5  
(June 2006) 
No-interest loan 
US$ 100 million - Help improve the regulatory framework for 
private development, and enhance transparency 
and accountability in state-owned enterprise 
operations and in the banking-sector; 
-  Promote human development through upgrading 
the quality of education, especially in poor zones, 
promoting inclusive education for children living 
with disabilities, improving the access of the poor 
to health services, more sustainable management 
of natural resources; and  
- Build modern governance in public financial 
management reform and in public resource 
allocation. 
PRSC 6  
(June 2007) 
US$ 175 million Promote business development; preserve social 
inclusion, better manage natural resources and the 
environment and to improve governance in 
support of Vietnam’s efforts to become  a middle-
income country by the end of the decade. 
PRSC 7 
( June 2008) 
Estimated 
US$ 200 million 
Approximate 
Aim at supporting the implementation of the 
Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP) 2006 
- 2010 
Source: The World Bank – Vietnam Poverty Reduction Support Credit Projects 
As seen from the above table, the World Bank has sustained its credit supports to 
Vietnam given the country’s steady performance in poverty reduction particularly and 
economic reform generally for development policy as commented by Klaus Rohland, 
former World Bank Country Director for Vietnam at the formal announcement of the 
approval for the Third Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC 3),  
The good macroeconomic situation and the continued progress in poverty 
reduction confirm that the overall development strategy of Vietnam is going well. 
Looking ahead the Government needs to continue its impressive reform pr gram. 
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Issues surrounding the financial sector and State-Owned Enterprises should be 
high on the agenda. 
 
The PRSCs worked for the CPRGS as a result in the country’s decline in poverty 
rate down to 24.1 in 2004 from 28.9 percent in 2002, 37.4 percent in 1998, and 58.1 
percent in 1993. In comparison between theory and practice related to poverty reduction 
strategy suggested by the Bank and planned by the Government, the items from the above 
table are well connected to those planned in the MDGs. In short, the campaign of poverty 
reduction has gone alongside the attacking poverty recommendation of he Bank and the 
MDGs.  
Also, the Government of Vietnam has been cooperating with the IMF on the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). This PRGF is the IMF’s low-interest 
lending facility for low-income countries. In theory, the IMF established PRGF in 
September 1999 to make the objectives of poverty reduction and growth more central to 
lending operations in its poorest member countries. PRGF-supported programs are 
framed around comprehensive, country-owned Poverty Reduction Strategy Ppers. These 
papers are prepared by governments with the active participation of civil society and 
other development partners. The PRGF has three key features: (1) The Principle of broad 
public participation and greater country ownership is central to the PRGF; (2) PRGF-
supported programs reflect more closely each country’s poverty reduction and growth 
priorities; and (3) PRGF-supported programs focus on strengthening governance in order 
to assist countries’ efforts to design targeted and well-prioritized spending. In practice, 
the Executive Board of the International Monetary approved on April2001 in principle a 
three-year arrangement for Vietnam under the PRGF in an amount of US$ 368 million.  
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The first release of the loan under the PRGF was amounted to about US$ 53. The PRGF 
loans carried an annual interest rate of 0.5 percent, and were payable over 10 years with a 
51/2 – year grace period on principal payments. As an illustration, the PRGF helps 
Vietnam to (1) Improve its competitiveness and attraction of foreign direct investment by 
pursuing further economic integration through implementing commitments with key 
trading partners. For example, Vietnam was committed to reduce tariffs under the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area on the majority of tariff lines to 20% by 2003 and to 0-5 
percent by 2006; (2) Reform the banking sector, aimed at enforcing better l nding 
discipline and transparency. In this way, each bank will undergo indepe nt audits on 
international accounting standards by year end; and (3) Tighten monetary policy with 
interest rate policy to be made flexible and the exchange rate to b expectedly managed 
more flexibly.  
The above explanation gives a greater role to market forces and minimizes 
administrative measures. The benefits brought about by the PRGF are significant as 
stated by Shigemitsu Sugisaki, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chairman at the 
IMF’s second review of Vietnam’s PRGF Program on June 21, 2002 as follows: 
The Vietnamese authorities have continued to make progress in implementing 
their three-year program, which seeks to improve competitiveness and spur 
investment in order to foster high growth and rapid poverty reduction. Economic 
performance under the first-year program was relatively strong and based on 
generally sound macroeconomic policies and progress in structural reforms… 
The authorities’ Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy has 
been prepared in a commendable participatory process. Its succesf l 
implementation will require careful prioritization and costing, strong expenditure 




More importantly, the CPRGS of Vietnam is in line with the MDGs64. In this 
regard, Vietnam has received a very strong support from United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). Since 1993, UNDP has been helping the Government of Viet Nam 
with its poverty and hunger reduction strategies and programs in leveling the economic 
playing field through regulatory reforms to develop businesses that cre te domestic 
employment and unleash the capacity of local entrepreneurs.  UNDP has been working 
closely with General Statistics Office (GSO) to improve its ability to collect and analyze 
poverty data. UNDP provides technical support to the Government on its ational 
programs to improve the lives of people living in ethnic and mountainous regions of Viet 
Nam. UNDP brings together and shares lessons learned from all its policies and programs 
on issues such as gender, poverty targeting, decentralization and local governance, 
infrastructure and credit for the poor.  
With Vietnam’s efforts to integrate into the global economy as discussed earlier, 
Vietnam has new opportunities for growth, but new challenges for poverty reduction. In 
this setting,  equitable growth, pro-poor policies and efforts to achieve the MDGs, remain 
at the core of UNDP’s advocacy and programming in Vietnam — and an overarching 
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goal in UNDP-Vietnamese cooperation65. Therefore, it is necessary to compare the 
MDGs and the Vietnamese achievements. 
Table 9 The Millennium Development Goals and The Vietnamese Achievements  
The Millennium Development Goals The Vietnamese Achievements  
Goal 1 : Eradicate extreme poverty and 
hunger by half between 1990 and 2015 
The poverty rate fell from 58.1% in 1993 to 
24.1% in 2004 with nearly 60% of poor 
household moving out of poverty. 
Goal 2 : Achieve universal primary 
education by completing a full course of 
primary schooling from boys and girls by 
2015 
The complete rate of primary education 
(from first to fifth grades) rose to 99.82% 
in the academic year 2003-2004; 
particularly the rise was seen in the Central 
Highlands and the Red Mekong Delta. 
Goal 3 : Promote gender equality and 
empower women by eliminating gender 
disparity in primary and secondary 
education and in all levels of education by 
2015 
The literacy rate of over 10 year-old 
population was 92%, of which the rate for 
women was 89.3% and for men 95% in 
2002. Disparities between enrolment of 
boys and girls had been reduced at all 
levels of education as of 2004: primary 
level (girls: 47.6%; boys: 52.4%); 
secondary level (girls:48.5%; boys: 51.5%) 
Goal 4: Reduce by two-thirds of the under-
five child mortality rate between 1990 and 
2015 
Particular attention has been paid to 
healthcare of mothers and children with 
encouraging results for the under-five 
mortality rate from 58% in 1990 to 31.5% 
in 2004; for the under-one mortality from 
44.4% in 1990 to 18% in 2004. 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health by 
reducing three -quarters the maternal 
mortality ratio between 1990 and 2015 
Priority has been given to maternal 
healthcare during pregnancy and at delivery 
with the maternal mortality rate decreasing 
from 120/100,000 live births in 1990 to 
85/100,000 live births in 2004.  
Goal 6 : Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases by having halted or begun to 
reserve the spread by 2015 
- Combat HIV/AIDS : very difficult with 
HIV cases of more than 15,000 each year in 
2001-2004 found in all 64 provinces/cities  
(more financial investment : 45-50 VND 
billion ) - Combat Malaria: effectively 
controlled between 1995 and 2004 with 
malaria case per 100,000 people decrease 
by 4.5 times  
                                                




Goal 7: Ensure environmental 
sustainability by reserving the loss of 
environmental resources  
- Increase forest cover from 27.2% in 1990 
to 37% in 2004 through the Five Million 
Hectares Reforestation Program – Have 
more access to clean water for the rural 
population from only 28% in 1996 to 58% 
in 2004  
Goal 8 :  Develop a global partnership for 
development  
- Inflows of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI)  
Source: UNDP Publication – Vietnam achieving the Millennium Development Goals 
 With a very strong support from UNDP, Vietnam has remarkably achieved the 
MDGs set by the United Nations. Though Vietnam is still faced with the threat of 
HIV/AIDS spread, the country is committed to staying firm on this course by investing 
more in prevention and treatment facilities as well as educational programs in order to 
raise the public awareness of this deadly disease.  
With all efforts Vietnam made as seen from the empirical evidences, the World Bank 
estimates that 30 million people were lifted out of poverty within 10 years; the poverty 
rate fell down as below.  
 
Source : Vietnam Poverty Update Report 2004 
Figure 11 Poverty Rate in Vietnam from 1993 to 2004 
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As mentioned earlier, Vietnam achieved the annual growth rate of GDP at 7.3 since 
2001. Vietnam is now considered as a success story for poverty reduction as indicated by 
Mr. Ajay Chhibber, World Bank Country Director for Vietnam as below:   
Although we have just arrived in Vietnam, we are very impressed by the initial 
results of the PRSC. With US$150 million granted by the WB and US$22 million 
provided by other donors in the first stage, now the program has so far received 
another credit loan of US$175 million from the WB and US$195 million fr m 
co-sponsors. The increase in the amount of aid as well as in the number of 
sponsors has proved that the international community strongly supports the 
Vietnamese government’s socio-economic plan and poverty reduction work. The 
WB is expected to increase its contribution to the PRSC7 to US$200 million.66 
 
The above achievements in MDGs and poverty reduction are also supported by the 
Vietnam’ National Plans in education and health presented in the below parts.  
4.5.2 Education development 
 Through implementation of the "open door” policy, the Vietnamese Government 
has been strengthening international cooperation in education, particularly the program 
"Education for All". International organizations, governments and non-government 
organizations have provided significant supports to Vietnam during the past decade. The 
focus of these supports has been on pie-primary education, on primary education, in the 
program of illiteracy elimination and post illiteracy elimination and in regular education. 
In the context of using resources provided by programs and projects, Vietnam has been 
utilizing the opportunities kindly provided by international support to achieve the 
objectives set by the program "Education for All' 67. 
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At the World Education Conference in Dakar, Senegal in April 2000, all 
governments, including Viet Nam, and the international donor community adopted the 
"Dakar Framework for Action, Education for All: Meeting our Collective Commitments" 
and committed themselves to prepare and implement programs that were credible to 
achieve goals set in the "Dakar Framework for Action".  
The Ministry of Education and Training of Vietnam, with technical assistance of 
UNESCO since late 2001, completed the preparation of the "National Education for All 
Action Plan 2003-2015" for Viet Nam. This Plan was approved by the Government on 
the 2nd of July 2003. The "National Education for All Action Plan 2003-215" is, on the 
one hand, a government tool for adjusting policies at the macro level in the area of 
Education for All and a framework for provinces and cities to develop their respective 
provincial “Education for All” plans. On the other hand, this Plan is a framework for 
guiding international organizations, bilateral donors and NGOs' financial and technical 
support to Vietnam in order to accelerate and ensure the quality of Education for All 
activities. The "National Education for All Action Plan 2003-2015" reflects the 
realization of commitments that the Government of Viet Nam made at the Dakar Forum 
to prepare a good quality, credible and feasible action plan.  
The Plan has identified general goals, specific objectives and targets for sub-
sectors of Education for All in Viet Nam for the period 2003-2015, including early 
childhood care and education, primary education, lower secondary education and non-
formal education. In addition, the Plan identifies action programs for achieving the 
objectives of each of the above components. Moreover, the action plan also forecasts 
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possibilities for resource mobilization from government, people as well as international 
support towards achieving Viet Nam's Education for All goals until 201568. Vietnam’s 
EFA has the following targets69 to achieve: 
Target Group 1: Early Childhood Care and Education Access (ECCE) with the objectives  
(1) to provide access to ECCE provision for 0 – 5 year old children, prioritizing ethnic 
minorities and disadvantaged children; and (2) to ensure that all children complete one-
year of quality pre-school education as preparation for primary school. 
 
Target Group 2: Primary Education with the objectives (1) to provide access to affordable 
and quality education for all children, especially for ethnic minority, disadvantaged 
groups and for girls; and (2) to ensure all children complete the full cycle of five grades 
of primary education. 
 
Target Group 3: Lower Secondary Education with the objectives (1) to extend access to 
affordable and quality lower secondary education to all children, especially ethnic 
minority, disadvantaged groups and girls; and (2)  to ensure that all children complete the 
full circle of four grades of lower secondary education. 
 
 Target Group 4: Non-formal education (NFE) with the objectives (1) to ensure that all 
out-of-school youth (in primary and secondary school age) have education opp rtunities 
to achieve; and (2) to ensure that all adults, especially women and disadvantaged groups 
have access to free and quality literacy and post literacy programs and to affordable and 
quality life skills programs lifelong learning opportunities.  
 
 WB showed a strong support for Vietnam’s EFA goals by a financi g project 
called “The Targeted Budget Support for National Education for All Plan Program 
Project”. This project provided targeted budgetary support for selected subcomponents of 
the Educational National Targeted Program (NTP), designed to enhance the quality of 
basic education, and strengthened the administration of the Education Naal Targeted 
Program.   
                                                
68 National Education for All (EFA) – Action Plan 2003 – 2015, available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001555/155533e.pdf 





More specifically, the project supported the Government of Vietnam to ake 
progress towards the improvement of education service delivery through the 
implementation of minimum quality standards, known as Fundamental School Quality 
Levels (FQSL) in the primary subsector.  During the life of the project, the share of 
schools achieving these minimum education quality inputs would increase. In addition, 
the project also promoted an overarching policy framework in education fina ce, 
planning and governance that will act as an enabling environment for improved service 
delivery70.  The project is briefed as follows: 
Source: ($m.) 
BORROWER/RECIPIENT 315.0 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION 50.00 




Approval date 28 June 2005 
Closing  30 June 2009  
 
Because "Education for All" is especially important in human development, the 
Vietnamese Government and people have been heavily investing staff resources, 
financial resources and intellectual endeavor in every component of "Education for All". 
In Vietnam the budget for Primary Education represents approximately one third of the 
national budget for education and training over the last 10 years. Furthermore, the fund 
for primary education contributed by the society in general and by individuals is 
approximately equal to the national budget destined for the primary cycle. The 
                                                






Vietnamese Government planned  to increase the budget for education and traini g from 
15°% of the overall national budget in 2000 to 18% in 2005 and above 20% in 2010, 
Vietnam has basically completed primary education universalization for children aged 6 - 
14 by 2000. During the next decade, in conjunction with consolidation of anti-illiteracy, 
the universalization of primary education will be enhanced to ensure that 99% of children 
of the schooling age range (6 -11 years old) will be encouraged to attend schools. The 
Vietnamese Government is fully committed to implement the universalization of 
secondary education, raising the number of students in the age range of this cycle from 
74% in 2000 to 80% in 2005 and 90% in 201071. 
4.5.3 Health Development 
 Vietnam has achieved levels in basic health indicators that are remarkably better 
than other developing countries with similar or even higher per capita incomes. Much of 
this achievement has been the result of widespread practices of promoting social 
solidarity and a relatively egalitarian distribution of wealth and income. Another factor 
that has contributed to good levels of health status by such a poor country is a health 
system that has wide population coverage with many modem and cost-effective disease 
control interventions and primary health care services delivered through an extensive 
grassroots health services network. Public investments and recurrent budget support for 
the grassroots health network are being given priority attention. These efforts are 
expected to yield gains in terms of further reductions in morbidity and mortality from 
preventable causes through more effective disease prevention, health promotion, and 
appropriate early treatment at the household, village, commune and district levels. Even 
as large health gains are expected from anticipated improvements in community health, 
                                                




large numbers of sick patients still require higher level clinical care for which public 
hospitals remains the almost exclusive provider72.  
Vietnam has its own National Health Plan supported by WB as shown in the 
project “ National Health Support”, approved on 16 Jan 1996 and closed on 31 March 
2005,  with the following details:  
The National Health Support Project's overall objective was to improve the health 
status of the rural population of Viet Nam in the poorer areas of the country. Specifically, 
it aimed to (a) provide high quality, reliable primary health care on a sustainable basis in 
sixteen of the poorer provinces; (b) reduce nationwide mortality and morbidity due to 
malaria, tuberculosis and acute respiratory infections, as well as the adverse socio-
economic impacts associated with these diseases; and (c) strengthen the capacity of the 
Ministry of Health (MOH) in policy-formulation, planning and management. To achieve 
these objectives, the project consisted of the following components: service delivery in 
the areas of infectious and communicable diseases; maternal and child health care; family 
planning; reproductive health services; and other basic health care; national program 
assistance for the Malaria, Tuberculosis and Acute Respiratory Infection Programs 
including provision of drugs, insecticides, transport, equipment and technical assistance; 
                                                






and strengthening institutional health planning and management73. The key components 
of the project and indicative costs were as follows74: 
Component 1: Assistance to Commune and District Health Centers (US$60.1 million 
equivalent to SDR 40.4 million estimated base cost, of which US$52 million or SDR 35 
million was spent).  
 
This component aimed to improve essential public health services at the primary 
Commune Health Centers (CHCs) and first-referral level at Dis rict Health Centers 
(DHCs) facilities in 15 provinces selected according to specific riteria outlined in the 
Staff Appraisal Report (SAR). The subcomponents were: (1) A package of civil works to 
upgrade or build new health facilities to meet certain minimum standards for service 
delivery; (2) Provision of essential drugs, basic equipment and supplies to the CHCs and 
DHCs; and (3) In-service training of health personnel to build capacity. 
 
Outcome: (1) the project improved the quality of available primary health care services 
within the specific provinces in the country; (2) the project through its well-targeted 
focus on poor areas of the country improved the quality of health infrastructure available 
in some of the poorest areas of the country thus creating a more equitable coverage of 
quality primary health care. 
 
Component 2: Assistance to Three National Priority Programs (US$51.4 million 
equivalent estimated base cost, of which US$39.8 million was spent). 
 
This component aimed to support three already established national health programs for 
malaria, tuberculosis, and Acute Respiratory Infections (ARI) respectively. (1) The 
National Malarial Control Program subcomponent aimed at protecting populations at risk 
of malaria through locally effective anti-vector measures, improved program 
management and epidemiological services. The project financed inputs such as 
insecticides, equipment, transportation, training, and technical assistance.  (2) The 
National Tuberculosis Program aimed at reducing the TB incidence within the general 
population as well as curing infected patients, through the attainment of a case finding 
rate of 70% of new infectious patients and cure rate of 85% of all patients enrolled in 
treatment. The project provided drugs, equipment, transportation, training d operations 
support.  (3) The ARI Program aimed to extend coverage of ARI treatments services to 
100 percent of children under-five years of age by the year 1999 through the provision of 
                                                










inputs such as the training of workers, financing of drug treatment costs, and the large 
scale implementation of a case management approach. 
 
Outcome: The objective of component 2 to reduce mortality and morbidity due to 
malaria, tuberculosis were not only met, but surpassed. Case fatality rate per 100,000 for 
malaria declined from 0.24 (1997) to 0.09 (2002); the prevalence rate per 1000 has also 
declined. The total annual number of deaths due to malaria declined from 203 in 1996 to 
46 in 2003. 
 
 
Source: National Health Support Project by the World Bank 
 
In addition, the number of confirmed cases of malaria declined from 76,356 in 1996 to 
37,416 in 2003. 
 
 
Source: National Health Support Project by the World Bank 
 
 
Component 3: Strengthening Institutional Health Planning and Management in the 
Ministry of Health (US$4.7 million equivalent estimated base cost, of which everything 
was spent including an additional US$0.8 million, resulting in a total of ab ut US$5.5 
million).  
 
Figure 12 Annual Confirmed Malaria Deaths from 1990 to 2003 
Figure 13 Annual Confirmed Malaria Cases from 1990 to 2003 
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This component aimed to improve the beneficial impact of policies affcting the health 
sector by enhancing the capacity of the MOH to use several halth sector planning and 
management tools. The subcomponents included: (1) Improving the planning and 
management of public expenditures for health by (a) Improving the budgeting, 
accounting, and operational reporting systems of the central MOH hospitals and 
institutes, provincial health departments, and the central MOH; and (b) Preparing a public 
investment plan for the health sector; (2) Assisting the government in better mobilizing 
private financing for health by improving the system of setting, charging and collecting 
prices for publicly provided health services to better protect the poor and increase 
revenues available to enhance the quality and quantity of these service ; and preparing 
proposals for further expanding private production of health services; (3) Generating 
population-based household data and analysis for health sector planning. 
 
Outcome: The staff in the MOH have benefited from these activities and their level of 
skills have been enhanced to use these policy tools, however, the projectdid no  focus on 
structural constraints to policy making and capacity building. 
 
Generally, Vietnam has achieved the majority of human development goals as set and 
illustrated in the sector of poverty reduction, education improvement and health 
improvement as above.  Nowadays, the most ambitious attempt to analyze the 
comparative status of socioeconomic development in both developing and developed 
countries has been undertaken by UNDP in its annual series of Human Development 
Reports. The centerpiece of these reports, which were initiated in 1990, is the 
construction and refinement of the Human Development Index (HDI). This HDI attempts 
to rank all countries on a scale of 0 (lowest human development) to 1 (highest human 
development) based on the three goals or end products of development: longevity as 
measured by life expectancy at birth, knowledge as measured by a weighted average of 
adult literacy (two-thirds) and mean years of schooling(one-third), and standard of living 
as measured by real per capita income adjusted for the differing purchasing power parity 
of each country’s currency to reflect cost of living and for the assumption of diminishing 
marginal utility of income. Using these three measures of development and applying a 
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formula to data for 177 countries, the HDI ranks all countries into three groups: low 
human development (0.0 to 0.499), medium human development (0.50 to 0.799), and 
high human development (0.80 to 1.0)75. By these measures, The HDI for Viet Nam was 
0.733, which gave the country a rank of 105th out of 177 countries with data in 2005 as 
below:  



















1. Iceland (0.968) 1. Japan (82.3) 
1. Georgia 
(100.0) 
1. Australia (113.0) 
1. Luxembourg 
(60,228) 
103. El Salvador 
(0.735) 









105. Viet Nam 
(0.733) 
56. Viet Nam 
(73.7) 
57. Viet 
Nam (90.3) 121. Viet Nam (63.9) 





















123. Vanuatu (63.4) 
124. Cambodia 
(2,727) 
Source: The Human Development Index – UNDP  
The HDI measures the average progress of a country in human development. The 
Human Poverty Index for developing countries (HPI-1) focuses on the proportion f 
people below a threshold level in the same dimensions of human development as the 
human development index - living a long and healthy life, having access to education, 
                                                
75 Michael P.Todaro and Stephen C. Smith, Economic Development – Ninth Edition, Pearson Addison 
Wesley,2006, p.59  
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and a decent standard of living. By looking beyond income deprivation, the HPI-1 
represents a multi-dimensional alternative to the $1 a day (PPP US$) poverty measure76.  
The HPI-1 value of 15.2 for Viet Nam, ranks 36th among 108 developing 
countries for which the index has been calculated. The HPI-1 measures severe 
deprivation in health by the proportion of people who are not expected to survive age 40. 
Education is measured by the adult illiteracy rate. And a decent standard of living is 
measured by the unweighted average of people without access to an improved water 
source and the proportion of children under age 5 who are underweight for their age. 
Table 11 shows the values for these variables for Viet Nam and compares them to other 
countries77.  
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108. Chad 173. Zimbabwe 164. Burkina 125. Ethiopia (78)134. Bangladesh 
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http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_VNM.html 
 




(56.9) (57.4) Faso (76.4) (48) 
Source: Human Development Index – UNDP 
It can be concluded that Vietnam is one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world. It is going through a far-reaching transformation from an inward-looking planned 
economy to one that is globalized and market based. It has the potential to be one of the 
great success stories in human development.  
4.6. Analysis of the policy implementation of Vietnam 
The adoption of a macroeconomic policy can be considered the dominant factor 
for economic development of Vietnam. For an economy to develop, it requires policy 
makers to select an economic theory/model applicable, practical, and fe sible to 
implement for the long run. In this regard, the Sixth Congress of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party (December 1986) marked a turning point of great significance to 
transform the Vietnamese economy to an open, market-oriented, and globally integrated 
model with a view to enacting policies for the integration of Vietnam into the world and 
regional economies as discussed earlier. This model of development is well-suited to 
Vietnam with its political and economic characteristics as a communist coun ry.  
The process of implementing the above policy has been handled thoroughly by 
the communist leadership of Vietnam. Vietnam has been examining closely both internal 
and external environments to make timely and appropriate decisions regardless of any 
periods the country endured hardship or has been taking off. For example,  while 
Vietnam was dealing with the China “factor” as indicated earli r in this the thesis, 
particularly in differing Sino-Vietnamese positions in Kampuchea, and  their mutual 
border, it was seeking to capitalize on Soviet ties to fully protect i self from the Chinese 
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hostility and international isolation. After a long period of time under Soviet protection, 
i.e. being dependent on Soviet, Vietnam found its way out from this depen nce by 
joining the world. Since Vietnam started to engage the world, it has also been very 
prudent to join regional and global cooperation on a step-by-step basis, i.e. one 





Chapter 5 - Challenges 
 While Vietnam has been scoring a number of significant economic and human 
achievements as shown above, it has also been facing some challenges.  
- The most noteworthy challenge would be a potential showdown in foreign direct
investment inflows as a result of the global financial crisis.  
 - Vietnam is in pursuit of privatization. As advised by the Party’s ideology, 
however, the state-owned enterprises should remain dominant in the whole economy 
system. It likely hinders a full market-based economy expected by foreign businesspeople 
and investors. The ninth national congress of the Vietnam Communist Party, which met 
in April 2001, endorsed a five-year program of SOE reform. This program has moved in 
fits and starts; by the end of this period, 3,349 SOEs were restructured of which 2,188 
were equitized. The state retains full ownership of 1,800 SOEs, including newly formed 
large-scale conglomerates in posts and telecommunications, coal, oil and gas, electricity, 
shipbuilding, cement, and textile and garments. The state sector is also privileged over 
the private sector in terms of preferential bank credit, tax breaks, state contracts, access to 
land, and government services. The state sector is also indebted. Stat  commercial banks 
continue to pour credit into industries that are most at risk from ASEAN competitors78.  
 - The wave of industrialization in the form of foreign direct investment projects 
has been converted agricultural land into industrial parks. This reduces the livelihood of 
farmers. This also leads to a new form of poverty suffered by landless farmers regardless 
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of a considerable compensation paid by the government and foreign investors to hem for 
their land conversion. This could also reduce the Vietnamese volume of ric  export to the 
world market.  
 - Like any other countries on the development path, the environment of Vietnam 
has been challenged by the process of development in the forms of trade liberalization 
and foreign direct investment, especially in the area of exploring and exploiting metal 
deposit. This challenge to combine environmental protection and sustainable economic 





Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
 From a dependent country facing famine and a failing centrally-planned economy 
by mid 1980’s, Vietnam has emerged as one of the fastest growing eco omies in the 
world. Real GDP has grown on average at the rate of 7.3 percent per year during 1995 – 
2005. 
Compared to U.S. dollars, income per capita rose from US$ 260 in 1995 to a 2007 
level of US$ 835. By WB estimation, Vietnam would enter the ranks of middle income 
countries by surpassing US$1,000 per capita next year (2010). Vietnam has been able to 
reach most of the Millennium Development Goals. The following factors have lead to 
Vietnam’s economic and human achievements:  
1) Vietnam did a significant move in adopting an appropriate and timely decision 
in foreign policy directions to graduate from dependence on the former U.S.S.R and to 
engage in the world as seen from the Sixth Congress of the Vietnam se Communist Party 
in December 1986. Relations with major powers and neighboring countries wer  put on 
the Vietnamese’s top foreign policy agenda.  
2)  Vietnam implemented the process of integrating the global economy very 
prudently at different levels for economic development. First, Vietnam unilaterally 
implemented its economic reforms by encouraging foreign direct investment, expanding 
more trading markets, and privatization. Second, Vietnam joined the sub-regional level of 
South East Asia Nation via ASEAN in 1995. As an ASEAN member, Vietnam was 
admitted to ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, AFTA, in December 1995. Under AFTA, the 
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member countries are bound by CEPT mechanism to cut tariffs as mentioned earlier. 
Third, Vietnam joined the supra-regional level of Asia-Pacific via APEC. The major goal 
of APEC is to develop the Asia-Pacific region into an area of free trade and investment. 
Fourth, Vietnam finally gained WTO membership in 1995. By partaking in these regional 
and global economic institutions, Vietnam has been gainful from foreign direct 
investment and trade liberalization; and   
3) Vietnam has been working closely with IMF, WB, and UNDP for human 
development within the framework of the MDGs. In the case of Vietnam, economic 
development and human development are closely connected.  
The model development of Vietnam as concluded above can be used as a success
story which would be adopted by other less developed countries, especially the remaining 
communist countries like Cuba and North Korea. Vietnam’s development experi nce has 
shown to the world that an appropriate foreign policy can make a break through into 
international isolation.  
Economic development can be achieved through foreign direct investment, rade 
globalization, and privatization by international economic integration. Human 
development can be achieved by reaching the MDGs and national plans in education and 
health with strong supports of international multilateral development agencies like IMF, 





Chapter 7 - Recommendations 
This study finally has the following recommendations for further economic 
development and human development of Vietnam. 
- Vietnam should expand investment in the labor-intensive light industries 
(textile, clothing, footwear) and some services (tourism) for these s ctors to grow and to 
be able to absorb the redundant labor force.  
- Vietnam should have a long-term policy to invest in modern technology and 
infrastructure to create a competitive  environment for FDI because China and other 
ASEAN countries are Vietnam’s main competitors for FDI.  
- Vietnam should establish an integrated approach of foreign direct investment 
incentives to harmonize the entire investment climate in Vietnam.  
 - Vietnam should build incentive mechanisms to attract self-financed Vietnamese 
overseas students to return to Vietnam in order to contribute to economic development 
and human development of the country.    
 - Vietnam should develop a long term plan for achieving economic and human 
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